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Abstract 
Pancasila, literally meaning "Five Principles", is the philosophical basis on which the 
modem Republic of Indonesia was established. It was devised in order to fulfil the 
goals and ends of independence. One such goal is the establishment of religious 
harmony and tolerance in national life. 
The aims of this thesis are, in the first pla~e, to explore the importance of such 
· a system as Pancasila, and to provide emphatic interpretation of Pancasila which in 
essence discloses the dynamics of religious interaction in Indonesia. 
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part is dealing with the 
historical context out of which Pancasila was found. Here, it is ultimately concerned 
with the question of the genealogy of Pancasila. It is also dealing with the question of 
how Sukarno -the first Indonesian president and the father of Pancasila- laid its 
foundation. The second part is mainly concerned with the questions of, what the 
elements of Pancasila are, and through what mechanism Pancasila is maintained. 
Thus, while the first part is historical, the second is cultural, and examines Pancasila 
from the cultural point of view. 
Pancasila as a cultural system will be dealt with from two angles, namely 
Pancasila as an evaluative system, and Pancasila as a symbolic system. 
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Introduction 
On 21 May 1998, Soeharto announced his dramatic resignation from power as 
President of the Republic of Indonesia. The world responded with shock. Indonesian 
people; students, activists, religious leaders, school teachers, all celebrated his 
downfall with joy and happiness. They expressed their freedom after being oppressed 
under his authoritarian rule for more than three decades. 
That Soeharto was an authoritarian ruler is very much true. For the sake of 
power, Soeharto had sacrificed the lives of thousands of his own people. East Timor 
is a clear example. Recently in Aceh, a province with a predominantly Muslim 
population- an independent human rights group found that an estimated 3000 people 
had lost their lives during military operations. The government accused the Acehnese 
of being anti-Soeharto. 
His 32 year rule was characterised by corruption, collusion and nepotism. He 
personified both authoritarian as well as paternalistic leadership. In terms of the 
economy for example, Soeharto's leadership was only associated with predatory 
business dealings of his own family and associates. It has been reported that at least 
120 companies among the suppliers and contractors of the Pertamina (the Indonesia's 
state oil and gas company) were owned by the Soeharto family and friends. They also 
enjoyed a monopoly on all imports of oil and its products worth billions of US dollars 
in 1996, and controlled its distribution. It is estimated that one of Soeharto's small 
family oil-trading alone, netted about 30 million British Sterling profit in 1997. 
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There are about 1 247 separate, active companies in which the Soeharto family 
members had significant shares. 
Behind them are yayasans, charitable foundations. These were key vehicles 
for Soeharto's financial interests which were never audited during his 32 years in 
power. It is likely that one yayasan could profit him hundreds of millions of pounds 
per year. 
Now that he has resigned, people want him to be brought to justice. Much 
condemnation and denunciation has been pronounced by the people. This thesis is 
somehow, a way of criticising Soeharto. Through the study of Pancasila -the state's 
ideology- I express my symphatetic attitude toward Pancasila, and my antipathetic 
disposition towards Soeharto. 
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first part consists of three chapters. 
The first chapter discusses the 'fReligions of Indonesia". Chapter two, explores 
exclusively the development of Islam and the influences of Hinduism and Buddhism 
on Islam. In this chapter Muslims are divided into three groups, one of which is 
puritan, while the others are not. Chapter three tackles the question of how Sukarno -
the first president and the father of Pancasila- evaluated and institutionalised the 
various existing "religious" norms and founded Pancasila. 
Part two consists of four chapters. The first chapter deals with the notion of 
Pancasila as an evaluative system. One of the key issues in this chapter focuses· on the 
notion of God within Pancasila. I place the God of Pancasila as a "God of religious 
tolerance" rather than the God of metaphysical order. The second chapter discusses 
the notion of Pancasila as a symbolic system. The third, explores the anti-Pancasila 




There are three major theoretical components that underlie this thesis. The first is 
Talcott Parsons's theory of action (Parsons 1951, 4-5). The second is Clifford 
Geertz's concepts of symbolic systems (Geertz, 1966), as well as his conception of 
three religiously-oriented systems in Indonesia, namely the santri, the priyayi and the 
abangan (Geertz, 1969). The third is Robert Bellah's theory of religion in general and 
his model of American Civil Religion in particular (Bellah, 1970). This notion of 
American Civil Religion is understood as an institutionalisation of religious norms 
and will be used to explain the process of how the norms of the three religious 
systems in Indonesia are institutionalised in the system of value and symbol of 
Pancasila. However, we are not concerned about whether Pancasila is to be called 
Civil Religion or not, for the exact application of the term civil religion is debatable. 
We are rather more concerned with the problem of Pancasila being a form of an 
institutionalisation of norms. 
Because the understanding of the term "institutionalisation" is so broad, let me 
use -for the purpose of this study- Samuel Huntington's definition of 
institutionalisation. He defined it as "a process by which organisation and procedures 
acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1968, 12-24). 
On the other hand, the central hypothesis that underlies this thesis is that 
whatever norms and symbols, or loyalties and commitments people may have when 
institutionalised, they are likely to be expressed religiously. It is here and in this 
sense that we will locate Pancasila. Pancasila is expressed religiously and thus 
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elevated to the level of a religious system simply because it institutionalises diverse 
religious norms and facilitates the interaction ofreligiously diverse people. 
The three components mentioned above form the major framework for 
analysis in this work. In the Parsonian theory of action human behaviour occurs in all 
human action. The elaboration of human behaviour in the formation of systems made 
up of human actions occurs in three configurations. First, the orientation of action of 
any one which is called the personality, and defined as the organised system of the 
orientation or motivation of action of one individual actor. Second is the social 
system, namely the action of plurality as a process of interaction, which is made up of 
the relationships of individuals, and organised around the problems inherent in or 
arising from social interaction of a plurality. Third is a system of culture which can be 
distinguished into three major classes of culture patterns, viz. 1) System of ideas or 
beliefs, 2) System of expressive symbols, and 3) System of value-orientation (Parsons 
1951, 6-8). Thus the elements of Parsonian theory are many and are comprehensive 
but the elements that are considered here to be the most relevant is his theory of social 
and cultural systems. Here therefore we choose these two theories as analytical tools, 
and employ them to bring us closer to the heart of our discussion, Pancasila. 
The above Parsonian framework will be married with that of Clifford Geertz's 
and Robert Bellah's. Geertz had introduced the three "religious" systems in Indonesia 
(all of them refer to Islam), namely santri, priyayi, and abangan. The abangan 
religious system represents a stress on the animistic aspect of religious life; santri 
represent a stress on the Islamic aspect, and priyayi represent the Hindu aspect of the 
religious phenomenon. The behaviour of these three religious systems will be 
analysed in terms of Parsonian theoretical schema of social system mentioned above. 
Meanwhile Parsonian theory of cultural systems will be utilised to analyse the 
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religiously-oriented value system of Pancasila. When we discuss the cultural system 
of Pancasila, Geertz's conception of symbolic systems will play its important role in 
order, first and foremost, to avoid the mechanistic character of Parsonian conception. 
Bellah's conception of general theory of religion, as such his thesis of 
"religious" identity will reinforce this theoretical presupposition. He maintained that 
a conception of identity is particularly necessary in a situation of stress and 
disturbance, because it can provide the most general set of instruction as to how the 
system is to maintain itself and repair any damage sustained (Bellah 1970, 11). He 
also said that through religious symbol man has symbolised to himself his own 
identity, and the order of existence in terms of which his identity makes sense (Bellah 
1970, 195). These two statements are relevant for the purpose of analysis of the 
cultural system of Pancasila at it's two levels: the former is relevant at the level of 
value system, while the later is relevant at the level of symbolic system. 
Research Approach 
Thus there are three approaches used in this research. The first approach involves the 
use of theory of -what Parsons called orientation of action. It says that the orientation 
of action entails selection. Selection is made possible first, by cognitive 
discriminations; it cognates the object field, discriminating any particular object from 
others and otherwise assessing its properties. Second, by cathectic orientation; it 
cathects particular objects through attributing to them significance for direct 
gratification or deprivation. Third, by the process of evaluation; the process of 
deciding among alternatives, of assessing them in the light of their ramified 
consequences (Parsons 1951, 10-11). However the second orientation (cathectic 
orientation) is omitted, whilst the first orientation (discriminative orientation) will be 
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employed to explain the discriminative behaviour of the three religious systems. 
Based on this particular approach, my thesis on these groups is that they all are 
discriminative in their way of dealing with the problem of what sort of identity the 
state should be based on. The third orientation ( evaluative orientation) will be used to 
explain the evaluative way of Sukarno (the founder of Pancasila), in dealing with the 
religious problem and in inventing the system of Pancasila. Inspired by Parsonian 
Frame of Reference (1951, 4-29) I would argue that, in evaluating the alternatives, and 
finally in inventing Pancasila, Sukarno had indeed invented the cultural system that 
consists of the system of value and the system of expressive symbol. 
The second approach involves a methodological framework adapted from an 
essay by Clifford Geertz, entitled Religion in Java: Conflict and Integration. This 
essay is published in a book called Sociology of religion: Selected Readings, edited by 
Roland Robertson. As we have said above, Geertz suggested that the Javanese 
population in particular, are grouped according to their religious beliefs, their ethical 
preferences and political ideologies into three main cultural types which reflect the 
moral organisation of each system. This framework introduced by Geertz still 
provides both qualifying and relevant concepts for the examination of religiously-
oriented behaviour of the three systems, and thus they are quite relevant to be used as 
premises to tackle the problem of Pancasila, particularly when we place Pancasila 
within a religious discourse. Hence, this framework provides the basis for deriving 
the three systems whose elements of religious norms, behaviour and -to some extent-
symbol, are of crucial significance in the formation of Pancasila's values and symbols. 
The third approach involves Robert Bellah's theoretical framework of religion 
in general and American Civil Religion in particular. Two elements of American 
Civil Religion are relevant for the discussion of Pancasila; the question of God and the 
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place of ceremonial events. If Bellah argued that God in the civil religion of America 
is more related to law, order and right, in Pancasila, I would argue that God is more 
related to the religious tolerance rather than to the God of metaphysical order. As far 
as the question of ceremonial events is concerned, -following Bellah again- I would 
consider the existing ceremonial events as a form of ritual that was designed to sustain 
the persistence of Pancasila. 
Concept of Common Identity 
At the core of this thesis is the conception of a common identity. In this term, we 
argue that the persistent domination of say, santri Islam as an exclusive identity 
promotes religious conflict that emerges particularly from individuals of non-santri 
community. In this sense, the concept of a common identity is a system of interaction 
of a plurality of persons. It is also historically understood as a system of how one 
particular group or system interacts and responds to another groups or systems. In our 
case, the response and interaction between the existing systems is always antagonistic. 
The common identity (Pancasila) is therefore placed as a process of evaluation or 
selection among the alternatives of an antagonistic system in an effort to end the 
antagonism. So far, selection/evaluation is seen as Sukarno's sole action, but this 
process of selection cannot be random in a social system. 
With regard to the content of Pancasila, this thesis upholds that one of the 
most important functional imperatives of the maintenance of social systems is that the 
value-orientations of the different systems must be integrated in some measure in a 
common system and symbol. To some extent, all on-going three religious systems do 
actually show a tendency toward a general system of common cultural orientations, 
but they remain restricted to their spatial proximity, or remain to -what Marion J Levy 
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called- a neighbourhood unit. The invention of Pancasila which contains core values 
of the three systems as well as an expressive symbol of the Garuda Pancasila is 
especially crucial in this process of evaluation for they are very dominant determinants 
of stability in the country. 
The three systems -santri, priyayi, and abangan- are viewed here as the source 
of conflicting norms., as the base of conflicting expectancy patterns, and as the source 
of differing reference groups. Using Clifford Geertz's word, they are viewed as 
(religious) primordial attachments (Geertz, 1963); something that stems from the 
"givens" of religious existence: the givenness that stems from being born into a 
particular religious community whose congruity of religion is seen to have an 
ineffable, coerciveness in and of itself. 
The three systems are also used as working models for the derivation of value 
orientations, and their religious behaviour are fully stated as the Animistically, 
Hinduistically, and Islamically oriented. Each of these terms refer to a predominating 
form of a particular culture. The three systems represent particular religious and 
cultural predisposition which serve as a cognitive (discriminative) sources as well as 
moral commitments for the members of each system. 
Concrete Foci of Analysis 
Certain concrete religious educational institutions of santri, priyayi and abangan were 
given an examination in the light of the process of a search for the national common 
identity. By exploring the educational institutions we also aim at explaining how do 
the three religious systems work. Behind the terms santri, abangan and priyayi is a 
notion of social action as a complex of cultural and social systems but categorised in 
terms of relevance to religious behaviour. Two hypotheses underline this religious 
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behaviour. First, in examining religious behaviour of the three systems or some 
aspects of it, basic religious conflicts are readily observable. This point is crucial, for 
it will contribute to our understanding of general religious behaviour in Indonesia over 
time. The second hypothesis derives from the argument that (1) the condition of 
religious pluralism prevents any one religion from being used by all people as a source 
of generalised meaning, but (2) people nevertheless need to invest their activity with 
meaning, especially when that activity brings together persons of diverse religious 
background. Therefore (3) a substitute meaning system is needed. Pancasila is placed 
here as that substitute meaning system. 
Finally, it has to be said that all social. analysis regardless of whether or not it 
deals specifically with religious structures, has common ground insofar as some aspect 
of human action is its purview. In this study we discard a "purely religious" element, 
to get a better understanding of the substantive aspects of the development of religious 




Search for a Common Identity 
I. History 
Introduction 
One of the most remarkable feature oflndonesia is its social and cultural diversity. Its 
culture does not constitute one homogeneous unity. It is an extraordinarily diverse 
country in its ecology, economy, demography, society and culture. Spread over 
Indonesia's 17,000 islands are some 300 ethnic groups distinguished by religion, 
name, language, custom, ecology and social organisation. These range from the 
fiercely Acehnese on the northern tip of Sumatra, the Javanese, the communities of 
Flores and Timor, to the Balinese and the tribes of the interior of Kalimantan and New 
Guinea. More recent immigrant communities are Chinese, Indian Gujaratis and Arab 
Yamanis. 
The Javanese are the dominant ethnic group. They represent over a third of, 
Indonesia's population. However, culturally and geographically they distinguish 
amongtthemselves on the basis of subtle differences in language, culture and region. 
Most importantly, and apart from natural, geographic and ethnic diversity, 
religious differences between the various world religions viz. Islam, Hinduism, 
Buddhism and Christianity are other factors that contribute to the diversity. Among 
these religions, Islam is the dominant. 
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However, given that the Javanese on the racial level, and Islam on the 
religious level are dominant, this thesis will concentrate more on Islam and on the 
Javanese. In other words, it will focus on Islam in Java. 
Religions and Colonialism in Indonesia I 
There are four recognised religions in Indonesia; namely Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism 
and Christianity (Roman Catholic as well as Protestant). Among these religions, 
Hinduism and Buddhism are the oldest. The first Indian Buddhists arrived in 
Indonesia between the first and the second centuries AD. They brought with them 
Buddhism in its two sects, Hinayana and Mahayana. The latter became more 
advanced in the 8th century AD. Many well-organised kingdoms with a high degree 
of civilisation were ruled by indigenous kings who had adopted the Hindu or Buddhist 
religion. This period is called the period of the Hindu Kingdom and lasted till the 
16th century AD. 
Among the early Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms were the first century kingdoms 
of Kudungga in the northern part of the country 'and Kutai on the island of Borneo. 
Kutai was ruled by the Hindu kings Devawarman, Aswawarman and Mulawarman. 
Around 502 AD there was a Buddhist kingdom called Sriwijaya on the island 
of Sumatra in the town of present Palembang. It was ruled by king Gautama 
Subhadra and later by his son Pyrawarman. This kingdom had diplomatic relations 
with the south Indian kingdom of Nalanda. The Sriwijaya built a school on its 
premises where Indians could learn the art of moulding bronze statues and broaden 
I This chapter is based on Indonesia 1996: An Official Book, editor-in-ChiefKosky Zakaria. 
3 
their knowledge of Buddhist philosophy. With the spread of Buddhism, Sriwijaya's 
influence reached out to many other parts of the archipelago. 
Another well-known Buddhist kingdom was Cailendra in Central Java. It was 
ruled by the kings of the Cailendra Dynasty. During their rule (750-850 AD) the 
famous Buddhist temple, Borobudur, in Central Java was built. 
One of the Pallawa language-stone inscriptions of 732 AD mentions the name 
of king Sanjaya who was later identified as the king of Mataram, a kingdom that 
replaced Cailendra in Central Java. In West Java there were the kingdoms of Galuh, 
Kanoman, Kuningan and Pajajaran. 
At the end of the 10th century (911-1007 AD) the powerful kingdom of 
Singosari emerged in East Java under king Dharmawangsa. He codified laws and 
translated into Javanese the famous "Mahabrata" epic. He also ordered the translation 
of the Hindu holy book, the Bhagavat Gita. 
At the end of the 13th century the kingdom of Sriwijaya in Sumatra began to 
fall as a result of a frequent attacks by the south Indian kingdom of Chola and by the 
East Javanese kingdom of Majapahit. Majapahit itself was a Buddhist-Hindu 
kingdom. It becan1e the only Hindu-Buddhist empire in the history of Indonesia that 
successfully united almost the whole archipelago. It was under king Rayam Wuruk 
that Majapahit became so-powerful. Majapahit declined and collapsed in 1520. 
Indian culture and customs were introduced during this Hindu period, such as 
the system of monarchical government, the ancestral system, the organisation of the 
military, the promotion of arts through literature, music and dance, architecture, and 
most importantly the religious practices and rituals. 
4 
Following the collapse of Majapahit, Hinduism and Buddhism consequently 
declined and Islam started to flourish. Islam came to the archipelago as early as the 
seventh century. It took firm root during and after the thirteenth century and soon 
acquired followers by virtue of its egalitarian philosophy. Muslims city states sprang 
up from Aceh in the western part of the country to the spice island of Maluku in the 
eastern part. Most of the early Muslims came from Gujarat and Persia. Along with 
trade they propagated Islam. The first Hindu king to be converted into Islam was the 
sultan ofDemak, Sultan Raden Patah. This Muslim Sultan spread Islam westwards to 
Cirebon and Banten and eastward along the northern coast of Java to the kingdom of 
Gresik. Sultan Raden Patah also brought the downfall of the powerful kingdom of 
Majapahit (1293-1520). 
Islam spread further east to where the sultanates of Bone and Goa in Sulawesi 
were established. Also under the influence of Islam were the sultanates of Ternate 
and Tidore in Maluku. North of Java, Islam spread to Banjarmasin in Borneo and 
further west to Sumatra. The island of Lombok, eastern Bali, was also converted to 
Islam later. Thus, up to the 16th century Islam was the only undisturbed power until 
the coming of Portugese and Dutch colonialism. 
The Portuguese arrived in Indonesia in 1511 after their conquest of the Islamic 
kingdom of Malacca on the Malaysian Peninsula. They propagated Christianity and 
were successful in Minahasa, Maluku and East Timer. 
Meanwhile, the Dutch had started their quest for Indonesian spices. They 
established the Dutch East India Company (VOC) in 1602. After the nationalisation 
of the VOC in 1799 the Dutch government had a firm grip on the vital territories of 
the country. People in these territories were forced to surrender their agricultural 
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· produce to the Dutch merchants. It was the beginning of Dutch colonialism 111 
Indonesia which lasted for 350 years. 
The Dutch introduced a policy of ruthless exploitation called "Divide and . 
Rule". They also secured the trade monopoly all over the country. To reinforce their 
monopoly in the Moluccas particularly, they undertook their notorious Hongi 
expeditions whereby they burnt down the clove gardens of the local people in an 
effort to eliminate production. 
Realising the danger of the Dutch, the Muslims declared the resistance against 
the colonial rule. Sultan Agung Hanyokrokusumo of Mataram sent his troops in 1629 
to attack the Dutch but they were repulsed. Sultan Hasanuddin of Goa waged a war in 
1666 and was also defeated. Prince Trunojoyo of Madura also fought and got killed 
in 1680. 
In 1814 the British came to Indonesia and built Fort York in Bengkulu on the 
west coast of Sumatra. During the Napoleonic wars in Europe when Holland was 
occupied by France, Indonesia fell under the rule of the British East India Company 
(1811-1816). Sir Thomas Stanford Raffles was the most well-known English 
' 
Governor in Java. After the fall of Napoleon and the end of the French occupation of 
Holland, the British and Dutch signed a convention in London on 13 August 1814 in 
which it was agreed that Dutch colonial possessions dating from 1803 onwards should 
be returned to the Dutch administration in Batavia, now known as Jakarta. Soon the 
Dutch intensified their colonial rule and sparked widespread revolts. Pattimura, a 
prince from the island of Sulawesi staged a revolt in the Moluccas (1816-1818). 
Prince Diponegoro of Mataram led the Java war from 1825 until 1830. Tuanku Imam 
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Bonjol led the Padri war in West Sumatra while Teuku Umar headed the Aceh war in 
North Sumatra (1873-1903). King Sisingamangaraja of the Bataks revolted in 1907. 
Between 1908 until 1930 many nationalist movements began to emerge in 
order to have a more organised struggle against Dutch colonialism. Budi Utomo 
(literally means "Noble Conduct") was founded on 20 May 1908. In 1912 Sarekat 
Dagang Islam {The Islamic Trade Union) was established. In the same year 
Muhammadiya, an Islamic oriented socio-religious movement was also founded. In 
December, still the same year Partai Indonesia {The Indonesian Party) was born. In 
1926 another Islamic movement called the Nahdatul Ulama' was established. In July 
1927 Sukarno formed the Partai Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Nationalist Party 
(PNI). This party adopted a militant policy of non co-operation with the Dutch as the 
result of a fundamental conflict of interest between Indonesian nationalism and Dutch 
colonialism. 
In short, within two-decades the Indonesians under the leadership of Sukarno 
and Muhammad Hatta finally declared independence on 17 August 1945. Sukarno 
became the first president and Hatta became the first vice president. 
The Embryo of Social Systems 
In independent Indonesia, Islam is the official creed of the overwhelming majority of 
the population. But while Islam is the religion of the majority the effects of colonial 
rule were evident in its divisive and disruptive effects. The Dutch strengthened 
certain elements of Indonesian society and ignored the others. The Christians and the 
nominal Muslims for example, became servants of Dutch colonialism. They were 
given administrative powers and skills. The Dutch also created or encouraged the 
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growth of new elements like the Chinese middle men while destroying the non-
Chinese (Legge 1980, 12). The resultant amalgam was a society that in many respects 
lacked natural cohesion. This in turn imposed on Muslims in particular an acute 
problem of political authority for independent Indonesia. If called 0n'to focus mi one 
point among the various issues of post-independence politics; one would say that the 
' .. ' 
task of creating a state and holding together disparate elements were among the most 
challenging. There was also a need to maintain the connection between the groups 
that composed the modern elite and the mass of ordinary people and most 
importantly, between differing religious traditions among Muslims. 
The task of holding together the differing Muslim religious traditions was 
however difficult, since the Muslims were not in the same boat. Besides having been 
divided by the Dutch, Indonesian Muslims were not all "Qur' anic" or Middle Eastern 
for example. Indonesian Islam in totality was not a "pure" form of Islam. It was 
influenced by other religions, particularly Hinduism and Buddhism which resulted in 
some Muslims being nominal and others religious. 
HistoricallJJ however, when Islam came in the seventh century and spread 
widely in the thirteenth century it soon adapted in the course of its existence to the 
already existing Hindu-Buddhist social and religious structures and served as a 
support to this existing socio-religious structure. Prior to the sixteenth century Islam 
was still restricted to the coastal regions of Java and had not been able to penetrate the 
interior. In the coastal regions it was accepted widely by virtue of its great emphasis 
on human equality and the value of the individual and spiritual side of life. It was 
welcomed because of its Qur' anic teaching that emphasised the importance of 
brotherly love, forebearance, mercy, reasonableness, humility and honesty. 
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In the latter half of the sixteenth century Islamic influence from the north-east 
coastal region starte'd to penetrate the Javanese interior region due to the rise of the 
Islamic state of Pajang (Ricklefs 1993, 40). Islam though, remained superficial in this 
region because of the influences of Hinduism and Buddhism being extremely strong. 
So strong were these influences that even until today the religious culture and tradition 
of this particular region is still very much Hindu-Budhist rather than Islamic. 
The fact that the Islamic power in the interior region had not established itself 
long enough because of the rapidly emerging Hindu state of Mataram and their attack 
on Pajang, confirmed that the spread of Islam in that region was quite superficial 
(Koentjaraningrat 1985, 320). 
The rise of the secular empire of Mataram during the first half of the 
seventeenth century and its continuous attempts to harass and undermine the centre of 
Muslim power, kept Muslim political force under control for the time being. 
Meanwhile the Javanese in the interior region managed to preserve the essential 
elements of the traditional Javanese Hindu-Buddhist civilisation. This situation 
lasted until the second half of the seventeenth century when the political· supremacy of 
Mataram weakened and socio-political instability brought about cultural poverty and 
an inability to resist the steadily advancing influence oflslam (Legge 1980, 55). 
Besides being superficial, Indonesian Islam is also syncretistic. This is to say 
that unlike the orthodox Middle Eastern Islam, the Islam of Indonesia was a kind of 
Islam that had picked up many mystical elements in India and Persia in addition to the 
local animistic traditions. Indeed, the mystical elements of Islam must have 
facilitated an easy contact between the Muslim missionaries and the local population 
to whom mystical concepts and ideas were familiar. Thus, the religious system, 
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culture and traditions in Indonesia had for a long time consisted of an integration of 
Hindu, Buddhist, Islamic, and to a lesser extent Javanese animistic elements. 
A concrete example. of that syncretism is the religious ritual of slametan.2 
This was originally an Indian religious ritual that merged with the existing Javanese 
animistic beliefs. The early Muslim missionaries converted this religious practice into 
an Islamic institution, and become part of Islamic tradition which resulted in Muslims 
being animated by the autochthonous traditions and beliefs that continue to have a 
hold on them. Another example is a Muslim educational institution of pesantren, the 
place where the Muslim students learn Islamic knowledge. This institution is 
originally a Hindu religious and educational institution of mandala3 that successfully 
converted to an Islamic institution (Wertheim 1956, 200). 
Due to the fact that Islam was superficial in some areas and strong in others, 
and because of Indonesian Islam being very much mystical and syncretistic, three 
different "religious" variants can be traced in terms of their acceptance of Islam. They 
all declare to be Muslim but they differ in how they express their Islam. They 
absorbed the Islamic impulse in different ways, The first variant are the people of the 
Javanese interior most of whom are of highly Indian-oriented native classes. They are 
gentry, cultivating an essentially illuminationist approach of the divine, a kind of Far 
Eastern gnosticism complete with meta-psychic exercises. This variant is better 
known as priyayi, a group of aristocracy which is organised around Hindu hierarchical 
2 Slametan is a religious ritual commonly held by the Hindu-Buddhist oriented Muslims as well as by 
the more puritan Muslims. Jt is often celebrated in anticipation of an event or held in honour of all 
matters of important occurrences in the life of a family, village or other social unit. The slametan is 
always ceremonial in character and is imbued with a deep religious significance. This institutions 
however, has no basis in Islam. 
3 Mandala is an autonomous estate under ecclesiastical authority, somewhat comparable to the West 
European medieval monasteries (Wertheim 1959, 284) 
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doctrine. The second is the peasantry that absorbed Islamic concepts and practices, so 
far as they understood them, into the folk religion which had absorbed Indian 
religions, locked in ghosts, gods, jinns, and prophets together into a strikingly 
contemplative even philosophical manner. They believe in many mystical and 
animistic elements from the ancient religion of Java, mixed with Hindu and Islamic 
influences. This variant is called abangan. The third variant is the trading class who 
rely more and more heavily upon puritan Islam and whose members are mostly 
haJ/is.4 They developed a compromise between what flowed into them along the 
haJjis line and what they confronted in Java in order to produce a religious system not 
quite doctrinal enough to be Middle Eastern and not quite ethereal enough to be South 
Asian. This variant is called santri5, the most "superior" Islamic group, organised 
around a definite doctrine and influenced by the urban orthodox ulama' 6 (Geertz 
1965/1969). The santris by virtue of their homogeneous ideals and objectives on the 
one hand, and their belief in puritan Islam on the other, are opposed to syncretism, 
mysticism and heterodoxy, the streams that both abangan and priyayi follow. It is at 
this point that the basic difference of norms between these three variants become more 
apparent. In addition, not only did they differ in their basic premises, they also 
competed with each other to keep their own norm dominant. 
These three variants are thus the major contending norms and had been 
competing with each other for at least four decades before the independence, 
4 Hajjis are persons who had performed a pilgrimage to the holy land of Mecca. 
5 The term santri originally meant "student" but has come to mean more generally, the serious 
follower of Islam. The term.abangan in its Javanese origin means "the red" as opposed to the putihan, 
"white", the devout Muslim or the santri. The term priyayi literally means an aristocrat. 
6 It should be noticed that this differentiation is very much schematic and should not be accepted 
uncritically as a descriptive account of the main elements of Javanese society. The three variants 
should not be too sharply distinguished from one another, and the differentiation is but a rough 
distinction. One for example, could be santri in outlook, but priyayi in the way of thinking. 
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particularly on the issue of national identity. We will therefore, have to study this 
historical conflict in order to reach the historical invention of Pancasila. This 
historical conflict however, as far as I am concerned, is the key to understanding of 
how the Pancasila was finally established. 
In the meantime the existence of these vanous variants has historically 
exhibited unique resources of cultural development in the country. It has resulted in 
the country's cultural and religious life never being static and has frequently shown 
itself to be dynamic. The concrete example of this is the prolonged and unique 
adaptation of Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic civilisation on the part of the Indonesian 
peasant society, the spontaneous growth of such Islamic states as Aceh (on the island 
of Sumatra) and Banten ( on the island of Java) as late as the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. And finally the unique pattern of cultural change among the Minangkabau 
on the west coast of Sumatra (Van der Kroef 1954, 83). 
When the Dutch came in the seventeenth century they soon introduced the 
notorious colonial policy called divide and rule and thus brought about socio-political 
problems. Applying its divide and rule strategy, its employment policy was to be 
based on discrimination (Legge 1980, 63). They only employed Christians, Chinese, 
or nominal Muslims of priyayi and abangan background while refusing to employ 
santri Muslims. In the educational field, only certain groups of people were allowed 
to go to Dutch schools. Moreover, the Netherlands East Indies state in Indonesia was 
a state with autocracy. It was like the aristocratic govermnents of pre-modern Europe, 
aloof and unresponsive, stood outside the society it ruled, and acted upon them 
arbitrarily and unevenly. 
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By the time Indonesia gained independence in 1945 it was troubled by 
particular political problems which stemmed from the fact that integration and 
reconciliation between the privileged priyayi-abangan and the deprived santri became 
difficult. This is true because the Dutch had left nothing but a legacy of antagonism, 
frustration~. and an embryo of potential conflict due to its divide and rule policy. They 
only contributed to the development of a plural antagonistic structure in Indonesia that 
caused the cultural and religious dynamism to disappear and be replaced by social 
discontent and frustration. 7 
The situation after independence was thus characterised by a severe and 
chronic form which happened because of the composition of religious primordialism 
created by the Dutch and which prevented any form of mechanism of mediation from 
being dynamic. 
The task of the new government after independence was therefore to get rid of 
any legacy left by the Dutch and most importantly to create a political frame by which 
antagonism between various groups and individuals could be domesticated. A 
political frame that in essence represented the interests of all citizens and clothed in a 
kind of cultural and symbolic garb , devoid of any specific racial or religious 
orientation. Thus, the new Indonesian state was challenged to not only transfer the 
sovereignty from a colonial regime to an independent Indonesia, or to merely shift the 
power from foreign hands to native one's, but also to transform the whole pattern of 
political life. As such, the challenge was to transform the power from the divisive 
regime of Dutch colonialism to an integrative new government. 
7 The Dutch priest Joseph Grubb, in his very recent speech in Toronto admitted this. See 
http://www.republika.co.id. 20-8-1998, WN! China di Kanada Minta Maaf Kepada Indonesia. 
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During the period of contemplation to transform the country, Sukarno ( d. 
1970) emerged and the cultural-religious dynamism was partly brought to life. 
Sukarno was the one that brought about a progressive extension of the sense of 
primordial similarity and difference generated from the direct encounter of culturally 
diverse groups in "local" contexts to more broadly defined groups of a similar sort of 
interacting within the framework of the entire national society. In addition, it was 
because of Sukarno that the major socio-political as well as religious groups in 
Indonesia including the three social systems came together to be involved in the 
national search for a common identity. 
Soon some new definitions of the country and a move into new age and 
national vocabulary arrived with novel ideas of organisations emerging and more 
sophisticated definitions of the so-called Indonesian identity evolving. The Javanese 
represented the more active community in this development. They were involved in 
the new form of religious, social and political leadership. However, this process of 
transformation took a severe and chronic form simply because of the great extent to 
which the peoples' sense of self remained bound up in the gross actualities of blood, 
race, language, locality, tradition, norm and most importantly "religion". 
Until this point, the problem of searching for a national identity had revolved 
around the question of what sort of value would occupy national life. Or put 
differently, what value and whose value would best be the basis for the state as the 
common identity? Is it that of the santri, priyayi or abangan? 
An observer might have expected that Indonesia, a nation with a powerful 
santri, would experience a resurgence of santri "Islamic" cultural policies. Such 
expectation is not always correct. The santri' s idealism above all is not accepted by 
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all citizens including the priyayi and abangan. In addition, the santri had no adequate 
cultural model of its own. An originator of purely santri Islamic culture is also hardly 
available, for Indonesian civilisation, despite the fact that the vast majority of its 
population are Muslims, rs itself an amalgam of well-known imports; 
Buddhism/Hinduism, local Javanese beliefs, Islam and to some extent Animism. 
Indonesia is not altogether santri-oriented. There is for example, no purely Islamic 
religious culture. The culture is rather characterised by a highly syncretistic religious 
life combining elements of Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam. Some of the Javanese 
santri Muslims do not even follow the fundamentals of Islam or the rukn of Islam 
seriously. They do not for example, perform the five daily salah regularly although 
they do spend a great deal of their time on Islam politically or- socially. They do 
firmly believe in Allah, but they also believe in a great deal of other religious concepts 
and perform many religious ceremonies which have little connection with the official 
religious doctrines of pure Islam. To some extent thus, the santri is identical to the 
priyayi and abangan. The santri also sometimes appear to manifest and represent an 
extensive complex of mystically inclined Hindu-Buddhist beliefs and concepts.as well 
as syncretistic elements of Islam. Doctrinally speaking indeed, the santris are more 
puritan than the other two. They are more closer to the formal dogma of Islam._. They 
advocate the most puritan form of Islam. 
The question is, if not santri "Islam" then what is the ideal common national 
identity? What sort of cultural elements are to be worn by all citizens as the common 
core of decency in national life? These are the questions that we are trying to answer 
in the following paragraphs. 
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In fact, the three major traditions of santri, priyayi and abangan represented the 
whole process of the historic adventure toward the finding of the common national 
identity. Intrinsically, they were never united in their views as to what kind of 
common values are appropriate for all Indonesians. Each group adopted their 
particular point of view and tried to impose it on its counterparts. Consequently, there 
was a continuous tension between the social systems as to how to construct a national 
community based on a shared identity, and deconstruct a socially or religiously local 
identity. 
However, a satisfactory understanding of the reasons for this constant tensions 
demands a circumstantial tracing of the stages through which their relationship to one 
another passed. And it is in the history of each tradition that such tracing is most 
readily to be accomplished. The religious, social, cultural and educational or simply 
ad hoc experiments that characterise each tradition, represent among other things a 
picture of a pattern of the system in which the looming blind clash of primordial and 
local loyalties evolved. 
Once again the three religiously-oriented social systems -which will be so 
referred to from this point onwards- remain the main religious and cultural paradigm 
in Indonesia. They constitute a dichotomy between puritan santri Islam versus 
Javanese syncretism and mysticism. They are established contrasts that remain the 
main axes of differentiation among the Indonesian religious and even social and 
political groupings. These three social systems will now be discussed in more detail. 
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II. Social Systems in Action 
Action must always be thought of as involving a state of tension between 
two different orders of elements, the nonnative and the conditional. As a 
process, action is, in fact, the process of alteration of the conditional 
elements in the direction of confonnity with norms. Parsons, The Structure 
of Social Action, p.732. 
Introduction 
The normative component of Parsonian theory of action is of primary significance to 
our discussion in this particular chapter. Normative orientation signals the point at 
which the "meaningful" component of action decisively begins to take effect. By the 
word "meaningful" we refer to any system that consists of two levels; symbolic 
system and value system. Thus, the conception of a normative orientation is 
understood here . as involving the fundamental concepts of value, symbol, and of 
culture in general. However, the normative orientation will be treated ·here as what 
Parsons called a cultural system, whereas the conditional orientati9n will be equalised 
to what Parsons called a social system. The conception of cultural system in this 
thesis is worn by Pancasila (to be discussed in the subsequent section), and the 
conception of social systems here are used by the three social systems of santri, 
priyayi and abangan. The three syste·ms are categorised as social systems simply 
because they involve a process of interaction between two or more actors. That is to 
say that in the three social systems the situation toward which the actors are oriented 
includes other actors. They are also systems whose action is conceived as oriented to 
goals, namely discriminative goals in this case. Thus, the social systems' concerns are 
categorised here into one instead of three modes of orientation8, namely cognitive 
8 Apparently, in Parsonian theory of action there are three orientations of action. First is cognitive 
orientation, second is cathectic, and third is evaluative orientation. In this section we only use the first 
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I ' 
orientation, which is understood here as a discriminative orientation. The concept of 
cognition used here therefore denotes a discriminative way of doing things. 
The reason for using this conception of cognition, namely discrimination as 
the key concept for the discussion in this particular chapter is that we need at least one 
category of motivational orientation to describe the system of action of the three social 
systems. On the other hand, we have assumed that the motivational orientation of the 
social systems is cognitive or discriminative in its nature, and that the three are to a 
significant degree, separate collective entities with their separate identities. They also 
constitute a distinct society and possess a distinct membership. Thus, they have what 
Parsons called a distinct "situational conditions" (Parsons 1982, 40); namely being 
born in a discrete place and environment and living as members of a certain territorial 
exclusive society and having the capacity to fit into any particular exclusive norm 
while reluctant to accept any other norms. · All these characteristics contribute to the 
three social systems qualifying as discriminative systems. 
In the following paragraph however, I will try to explain inevitably the norms 
of the three social systems mentioned above, by invoking partly their system of 
educational institutions. These educational institutions undoubtedly played a crucial 
important role in expressing and to some extent imposing their particular norms. On 
the other hand, each group expressed its response to a particular phenomena in a way 
quite different to the other. The structure of that expression can be traced more easily 
from their educational system because it is through education -although not education 
category for the purpose of our analysis. The second is omitted, while the third will be used in the 
analysis of the next chapter. 
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alone- that any expressions of any members of any society are defined. It is through 
education also that the general inculcation and maintenance of norms are carried out. 
This section is therefore concerned with the question of what are the norms of 
the social systems. Here I am careful in using the words norm and value. The word 
norm will be used for the normative component that is specific to the social systems, 
while the word value is used for the normative component of Pancasila. 
Privavi and the Norms ofBureaucratic Populism2. 
A. Budi Utomo 
The beginning of the 20th century is a period of initial reflection as to the 
fundamentals of the common Indonesian national identity. A period where the 
demand for a consideration of the ideals for the country had emerged. This reflection 
was in the first place, influenced by a conviction on the part of many Indonesian 
intellectuals that from a socio-religious point of view Indonesia was in chaos and had 
been so for a long time. Just as many Indonesians felt that the Dutch colonial regime 
divided them and gave them no or little opportunity to advance themselves politically, 
intellectually and economically by being absorbed in the higher echelons of 
administration, public life, and business, so they have felt that a self-consciousness 
movement was essential if Indonesia was to ever attain its own national culture and 
identity. 
The problem which immediately arose when self-consciousness movements 
emerged was precisely that a common national identity was alien to the majority of 
the Indonesian masses. As such, the problem was that the Indonesians possessed no 
9 For more detail and sophisticated discussion on the subject of priyayis, their leaders, varieties, their 
political ideology, their influences on urban society and so on, see William H. Frederick's Visions and 
Heat: The Making of Indonesian Revolution. pp 34-80. 
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uniform basis for a common national identity. Nevertheless, they were quite aware 
that such an identity was needed. They were quite aware also, that in an Indonesian 
society where social conflicts were of such magnitude, that the absence of any 
normative force that can play as an identity for all may well be fatal to the future of 
national life as whole. In such conditions where there was no uniform basis for the 
establishment of a common identity, and with no stable social framework in which 
this difficulty could work itself out, the priyayi under the leadership of Wahidin 
Soedirohoesodo (1857-1917), initiated the attachment of a national self-consciousness 
movement by establishing an educational institution called Budi Utomo on 20 June 
1908 (Zakaria 1995/1996, 33). 
This movement belonged to the priyayi as its founders were mainly priyayis. It 
was initially aimed at improving general education for the common Javanese 
population and promoting the Javanese culture in general. Subsequently the 
movement set in motion a nationalistic movement for the political independence of 
the whole Indonesia (Ricklefs 1993, 164-5). 
By establishing Budi Utomo, the priyayi thus become the first group to realise 
the importance of education, and that education is the key element for advancement. 
The priyayi group represented a major social and cultural stream in twentieth-century 
Indonesia. 
Like the abangan, the priyayis are Muslims whose adherence to Islam is 
seldom more than a formal, nominal commitment. They tend to be mystical in their 
religious ideas, and relatively unconcerned about the demanding ritual obligation of 
Islam (prayers, fasting, giving alms, etc). Culturally, they are more Hindu-Buddhist in 
inspiration rather than Muslim and have their origins in the court ideologies 
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of pre-colonial Java. In the course of the twentieth century these ideologies of pre-
colonial Java were linked first to the colonial ideal of bureaucratic service and then to 
their own ideology of priyayi nationalism. Understandably therefore, the priyayi's 
norms are a mixture of what I call archaic-Javanism, colonial Western idealism, and 
local nationalism. These basic norms were traceable particularly when they made 
efforts to search for the common national identity as the basis for state ideology. 
They for example, tried to determine and propagate through this educational 
movement of Budi Utomo any existing features of the past that could be found. They 
searched the mythological links with pre-civilisation Java, to the times of early 
historic colonialisation by the Hindus and Buddhists, to the times of archaic Java. 
Colonial idealism on the other hand, was already part of their norm when in 
the early twentieth century Western education particularly that of the Dutch, seemed 
to offer to this upper class a key to a new synthesis which they saw as the basis for a 
rejuvenation of the national identity. 
Nationalism was also part of their norm, discernible when Budi Utomo in the 
very early stage of its history in 1909 had already decided to adopt a Malay language, 
subsequently called Bahasa Indonesia. (Indonesian Language), instead of Javanese 
language as the official language. This move of using Bahasa Indonesia as a formal 
language was soon followed by other organisations after Budi Utomo. 
The nationalistic implication of this movement lies among others, in the fact 
that after 1918 the movement was called Jong Java (Young Java), moving then to 
become more political than educational. It was involved in organising a series of 
major political congresses held mainly for the purpose of independence. Jong Java 
was responsible for some major political commitments like that of the notorious 
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pledge of the youth, known as the Sumpah Pemuda, in which a joined young students 
from all over the country pledged that they will remain united as: One country, one 
nation and one language (Zakaria 1995/1996, 35). 
The birthday of Budi Utomo on 20 May 1908 is now celebrated annually as 
the Day of the National Awakening by the govei;nment. 
B. Taman Siswa 
Like in Budi Utomo, a positive trend to build a common identity as a national culture 
by preserving the valuable assets of the past together with the selective adoption of 
new elements is also to be found in the priyayi's Taman Siswa (Students' Garden) 
educational movement. 
The fact that the movement was trying to preserve the assets of the past only 
confirmed that it wanted to express their norm of "archaic Javanism", a norm that is 
culturally and intellectually expressed particularly in the wayang10 performances and 
literature. The older generation regularly watch the wayang and read and study the 
traditional moralistic literature and books written in Javanese script that tell the story 
of the wayang. Understandably then, the way of life of the priyayi is largely 
influenced by the symbolism of wayang and the morals of Javanese literature. Their 
way of life is also predominated by the classical phrases of wisdom of ancient poets, 
mystical ideas about the emotional experience of discovering God in one's self, and 
10 Wayang is a cultural performance that expresses the values of an archaic Javanism, namely the 
heritage of the Hindu-Buddhist religions. Through it the heritage is expressed and preserved. Most of 
the wayang stories are based on .the old Hindu-Javanese literature and stories such as the Hikayat Seri 
Rama (The story of the Lord Rama, based upon the Ramayana), and the Hikayat Pandawa Jaya (The 
story of the Victorious Pandawas based ultimately on the Sanskrit Mahabrata, but apparently taken 
directly from the old Javanese Bharatayudha. There are also wayang whose stories are based upon 
Javanese stories concerning the legendary pre-Islamic heroes such as Panji and Damar. 
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complicated syncretistic religio-magical concepts of human existence 
(Koentjaraningrat 1985, 453). 
Found in 1922 by Ki Hajar Dewantara (1889-1959), Taman Siswa was 
oriented towards creating national cultural ideals based on methods of instruction 
which stimulated a harmonious development of the rational, spiritual, and physical 
abilities of the youth (Wertheim 1959, 303). Ki Hajar Dewantoro was from the 
Yogyakarta royal house of Pakualam, and a brother of Surjopranoto, a leader of 
Central Sarekat Islam. Despite the fact that he was a brother of an Islamist, he was 
well known for his constant reaction to the rising tide of Islamic reform. The birth of · 
Taman Siswa was said to have marked and initiated the beginning of clear antagonism 
between the Central Sarekat Islam (the santri movement) and the Taman Siswa (the 
priyayi movement). Taman Siswa is also said to be a result of a cultural confirmation 
that Islam was not to be regarded as the only basis for national identity (Ricklefs 
1993, 177). 
Perhaps the idea of establishing Taman Siswa came when Dewantoro joined a 
Javanese mystical group in Y ogyakarta, where Muhammadiyah, the santri educational 
and social movement was found. This mystical group felt that a truly indigenous 
educational system was needed. Upon finding the Taman Siswa he combined 
European style of education and traditional Javanese arts of the past. He hence 
expressed through this educational institution his priyayi norms of Western idealism 
and archaic Javanism. 
Taman Siswa endeavoured to produce a system of education for Indonesian 
youth. It was aimed at providing education on an Indonesian nationalist foundation 
and to raise the youth in a harmonious atmosphere. It was also aimed at giving 
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attention to a full and balanced development of all faculties of heart and mind and 
awaken among the Indonesian youth a consciousness of their place and task in the 
world they were living in. 
In order to achieve their dreams the priyayis had done a great deal of work in 
line with the doctrine of archaic Javanism. Among their doctrine is the so-called 
doctrine of ikhtiyar (originally an Arabic word, which means a human endeavour), a 
concept that indoctrinates people to work hard to achieve something no matter how 
difficult the situation is. It is from this meaning of the intensification of a work ethos 
that the Javanese proverb rawe-rawe rantas malang malang putung (all things that are 
hanging down must be pushed aside and all obstacles must be broken into pieces) 
means. This proverb is often heard in the wayang performances and pronounced by 
the high rank state officials. The phrase is also often pronounced when a group of 
people are about to perform collective action to remove a major obstacle. It is also a 
saying to intensify the spirit of co-operation, namely the spirit of gotong royong 
(mutual corporation), which is also one of Pancasila's dogma. 
In archaic Javanism they also learn that the ultimate goal of human life 1s 
being connected to the idea of merit., With exception of those priyayis who are 
engaged in kebatinan 11 they do not connect the idea of merit to the ancient Hindu-
Buddhist idea of karma but rather with concrete ideals of achievement in this life 
(Koentjaraningrat 1985, 455). It is this kind of thinking that confers status and power 
11 Kebatinan literally means inwardness. The term is used to describe the indigenous mystical sects 
with hybrid theologies. The history of this theology is not well-recorded. However since 1957 
kebatinan groups had sought recognition from the government as the equal of other religions. Islamic 
groups had always opposed this. It was once recognised by the government as "belief' (Kepercayaan), 
which the I 945 constitution appears· to recognise alongside other religions, and thus equal to them. 
The debate as to whether kebatinan should be considered as a religion, belief or merely cultural 
phenomenon had recently finally ended. Not long ago, before the downfall of Soeharto, the Muslims 
succeeded in persuading the government to regard kebatinan merely as a cultural phenomenon and not 
belief or religion. 
24 
on the priyayi and thus drives them to build the nation on the basis of merit in this life. 
This doctrine is an outward symbol of achievement and hard work as well as an 
inclination for good life, sufficient wealth, status and power. 
The fact that the movement of Taman Siswa originated in the Javanese city of 
Y ogyakarta, and the establishment of its first school there, gave it a strong Javanese 
orientation. During its initial years from 1922 to 1930s the national character of the 
educational system largely emphasised on archaic J avanism. This was achieved by 
including Javanese language, literature, history, and the Javanese art of dance and 
music in its curriculum. Other elements of its norms such as Indonesian nationalism 
was introduced latter. Geography and ethnography of the Indonesian Archipelago, 
which taught the pupils about the existence of other regions, its cultures and norms 
outside Java were also taught latter. Once the elements _of Indonesian nationalism was 
taught, the Taman Siswa was given a wider national orientation and thus the 
movement was now far from being regionalist or exclusive, though dogmatically 
speaking it was still exclusive in the sense that it did not belong to all but to the 
priyayi alone. Like Budi Utomo, Taman Siswa adopted Indonesian as the official 
national language (Koentjaraningrat 1985, 74). 
The idea of adopting the Indonesian language as a 'language for all' by Taman 
Siswa and Budi Utomo- perhaps stems from the fact that the priyayi does not 
recognise the idea of exclusivism. They only recognise a person's relationship with 
his fellow human beings as co-operative with the fellowship deemed as the most 
important concern of priyayi. They only recognise behaviour, manner and etiquette 
that are collaterally oriented. The idea that a person does not stand alone in this world 
is very important to the priyayi. A person must know that he/she can not live unless 
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he/she relies on his/her fellow human beings. This doctrine consequently imposes on 
the priyayi the obligation to maintain good relations with other human beings, and to 
pay constant attention to their needs and share with them as much as possible. The 
priyayi's co-operative inclusivism is expressed in the following Javanese phrase, 
wonten sakedik dipundum saketik, wonten katah inggih dipundum katah, which means 
"if there is only little each will receive little, but if there is much each will receive 
much". At the religious level the priyayis hold religious gatherings such as slametan 
feasts and celebrations. This co-operative spirit and inclusivism is drawn from 
archaic Javanism and therefore constituted an important part of priyayi norms. 
However, within the first decade of its existence, thanks to the priyayi's 
doctrine of co-operative inclusivism, forty Taman Siswa schools were established at 
other places in Central and East Java, in the Sundanese area of West Java, in East 
Sumatra, in South and East Kalimantan and in Bali. This confirms thus, that the 
priyayi's Javanism has no rigidly structured system of social relations, especially as it 
concerns co-operative functions. 
Subsequently, besides education, the movement aimed at gammg 
independence from the Dutch. It was bound to render an essential service as an 
expression of its desire for cultural and political independence (Wertheim 1959, 304). 
It was for this precise reason that the Taman Siswa movement could be considered as 
an important Javanese priyayi element in the general Indonesian nationalistic 
movement. Taman Siswa was thus transformed from being an educational movement 
into a political one. However, although its aim was now for independence, its 
framework remained that of education. It continued to struggle for political 
independence through education. Its leaders on the other hand, seemed to be quite 
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aware that education had a very important function in the political arena in general 
and for independence in particular (Frederick 1989, 48-9). 
Thus, the priyayi had indeed given a general framework and an intellectual 
contribution as to how the common national identity should look like. The rise of the 
priyayi 's educational movements of Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa is therefore to be 
deemed an integral part of the broad history of Indonesian nationalism on the one 
hand, and the history of searching for common national identity on the other. 
Yet despite all its idealism, Taman Siswa had failed to build a common 
national identity shared by all citizens. Instead of being accepted by Indonesians, the 
norms of Taman Siswa were welcomed mostly by the Javanese and thus stimulated 
the growth of a Javanese identity. This after all, tells us that the people refused to 
accept the synthesis of the glorious Javanese past, Western idealism, and modern 
nationalist norms as suggested by the priyayi. Furthermore, within the priyayi grew a 
radical endeavour to create an extreme mental attitude of self-sufficiency that tended 
to develop towards Javanese isolationism away from the dynamic thinking towards an 
Indonesian national culture (Koentjaraningrat 1985, 75). Thus, the proces~ of 
transformation from being co-operative.into discriminative had taken place within the 
stream of priyayi. 
This failure and internal problem resulted in priyayi being divided into two 
groups, a division that definitely weakened the cultural power of the priyayi. The two 
are·. the literati group and the intelligentsia. The former was more concerned with the 
restoration and preservation of only the indigenous sophisticated Javanese tradition in 
an exclusive and puritan manner. The intelligentsia claime.d to be the mediator of 
their society with their syncretic structure. They were cultural middlemen, a group 
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who increasingly become skilful and based their claims to political and social 
ascendancy on their achieved skills. 
Through the period of rising nationalism on the eve of independence the 
political tendencies among the priyayi intelligentsia were increased and thus political 
parties started to emerge. 
The PNI, Partai Nasional Indonesia, (The Indonesian National Party) was the 
priyayi intelligentsia's party. Under the influence of Budi Utomo's and Taman 
Siswa's ideas of national unity (Legge 1980, 132-3) the party was found in July 1927. 
This party was not only a political party in the sense that it was not only concerned 
with an immediately applicable political program, but it also desired to establish an 
entire way of life and philosophy of the social order. Although the party's elements 
were mainly Javanese its membership was Indonesian. A paradox characterised the 
movement: although divided by enormous cultural, social and ideological differences 
it was permeated by an enthusiasm for national unity. This emphasis on unity 
concealed a wide variety of opinion on what form independent Indonesia should li-ke. 
By now the priyayi intelligentsia had introduced more emphatically an element of 
their norm to the national life, namely the necessity of national unity. This norm was 
subsequently adopted as one of the Pancasila values. 
The priyayi intelligentsia dominated the PNI movement and continued to 
emphasise their norms of Western idealism and modern nationalism, while to some 
extent disregarding the archaic Javanism. I call their set of norms and ideas, using R. 
William Liddle's term, "Bureaucratic Populism" (1985, 81). 
A number of Indonesia's early leaders including the first Indonesian vice 
president Muhammad Hatta (1902-1980) and Sutan Sjahrir (1909-1966), the first 
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prime minister, belonged to this group. Sukarno though, is not part of this group. He 
had no formal ideological connection with them although his name was widely 
associated with the PNI. The priyayi intelligentsia came from the new elite which had 
grown as a result of education and employment opportunities within the Netherlands 
Indies. In the colonial period the priyayi intelligentsia of the cities politically and 
culturally dominated the country and came to constitute Westernised enclaves. The 
PNI thus essentially stemmed from the Indonesian urban elites who placed a premium 
on positivism and technology, Westernised education, liberal traditions of nineteenth-
century Europe, and urban life-style. It was in the cities that the priyayi kindled the 
fire of nationalism, and here that they led the people and introduced to them the word 
"independence". From the beginning then the priyayi intelligentsia were products of 
urban and Western culture. 
The PNI thus, in effect, sought to create a bourgeois civilisation in the Western 
sense of the word based upon a substantial middle class, a developed economy and a 
stable entrenchment of state control of the economy (Van der Kroef 1954, 66). This 
in turn left a gap that the priyayi intelligentsia had attempted to fill with numerous 
Western secular and nationalist dogma, the activities of new nationalist association, 
and nationalistic patriotic anthems and speeches. While these efforts did appear to 
have meaning for the priyayi intelligentsia, as a small but rising sector of the new 
national elite, they remained empty for the majority of Indonesians, the peasantry. 
The native population, the peasantry lived in altogether different circumstances with 
entirely different kinds of norms. The priyayi were not quite aware that the character 
of their nationalist movement and its norms had not been determined by the culture of 
this largest and traditionally the most important section of the population. In addition, 
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not only did the priyayi try to impose their norms on the peasantry, they also placed 
no room for the peasant norms in their system (Legge 1980, 10). 
Furthermore, the village community was also under attack by the priyayis 
from all directions. In their enthusiasm to modernise Indonesia their political leaders 
believed that they had to change the customs of the village. They believed that the 
villages were not able to find sufficient resources within its social body to absorb the 
required changes. This assumption among the majority of priyayi leaders made them 
frequently unaware of the strength of the indigenous way of the village. 
It was the santris who met the need of rural Indonesia. The santris gave the 
answer for the need of the village societies. They, to a significant degree, represented 
the indigenous way of life, the village life of the peasantry, the majority of the 
population. 
Santri and the Norms oflslamic Salvationism-Universalism 
A. Islamic Salvationism 
The acceptance of Islam in Indonesia had been to some extent, as some would argue, 
(Geertz 1968/Feith 1964, 261) nominal and superficial, intense only in certain 
restricted areas or movements of the past four generations. As a result, some Javanese 
remained aloof and essentially Hindu in their culture. 
Purely pagan pockets also remained with some having respectable bodies of 
ethnic customs codified under the Dutch regime whose policies were favouring the 
retention of Western culture in a pure form, while encouraging the separate 
continuance of all regional, local and above all religious cultures. Under the policy of 
divide and rule only Christians or nominal Muslims, namely the priyayi and abangan 
could work for the government. They earned good money while the santris were not 
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more than "guests in their own homes". The santris were discriminated against by the 
government even after independence. 
With the emergence of the self-conscious movements in post-independent _ 
Indonesia, movements represented by the santri were not easily welcomed. The 
priyayis and the abangans strongly resented any Islamic self-consciousness 
movement. Nevertheless, it became the property of the majority of people, the 
peasantry, a majority around whom the general movement toward Islamic self-
conscious has commonly been associated. 
The majority of population are simultaneously Muslim and santri. In principle 
they are Sunnis and followers of the Shafii school of law. Many of them are pious 
and involved in Sufi mysticism, notably the Shattariya, Qadariya, and 
Naqshabandiyya sufi orders. 
As nationalism began to grow among the people the santri following the 
establishment of Budi Utomo, began to think about establishing Islamic religious 
leadership. An Islamic consciousness was launched on the most significant period of 
reform in its history. In 1909 a group of Javanese santris under the leadership of 
Tirtoadisurjo, who previously worked for the Dutch governmental service and left to 
become a journalist, founded Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Commercial Union) in 
Batavia, now Jakarta (Ricklefs 1993, 166). Tirtoadisurjo was succeeded by H.O.S 
Tjolaoaminoto (1882-1934). Tjokroaminoto was a charismatic figure who became 
known for his belligerent attitudes towards those in authority whether Dutch or 
Indonesian, and was soon to become the most prominent leader of the early popular · 
nationalistic movement. In 1912 the organisation changed its name to Sarekat Islam 
(Islamic Union, SI) and aimed essentially at gaining independence and providing an 
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Islamic social basis for the Indonesian state. Normally speaking, given that the SI's 
leaders were educated in Dutch educational institutions, the SI's norms must have 
contained some elements of Western idealism. It must also have contained a norm of 
nationalism since it was destined to become the nationalist vanguard of a new Muslim 
political movement. 
But the Islamic origins of the organisation, the term Islam in its title, and its 
membership that was dominated by the santri reflected little more than a general 
awareness that its members were Muslims-santri while the Christians, the Chinese as 
well as priyayi and abangan were not. In the eyes of the "others" it became an 
expression of santri-Islamic solidarity against everything non-Islamic and everyone 
non-santri including priyayi and abangan. For most santri leaders the problem of 
national identity was however a problem of choosing Islamic identity as the identity of 
the state rather than a problem of choosing among essentially differing identities or 
traditions (Cribb 1995, 39-40). Religious and cultural pluralism were thus seen as 
something that in fact did not exist. Non-Islamic religions including Christianity, 
other norms including Western idealism, archaic Javanism and Indonesian nationalism 
were in essence unlawful since Islam as the dominant ideology of the vast majority of 
Indonesian Muslims by its doctrine was deemed as the only valid basis for the 
common identity of all Indonesians. The .santri in general and more so the very 
traditionalist ones did not admit any competitors for Islam. 
Indeed there is nothing wrong in Islam being the basis for the common identity 
of the state since its laws served to make people good. It encouraged persons to be 
righteous, to be a "person of virtue". But the problem is more than merely Islamic 
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norms being good or bad for the basis of the state. The problem is that in a pluralistic 
society an exclusive ideology is not acceptable by the "others". 
B. Muhammadiyah: Puritan Islamism 
At the educational level the first santri socio-educational movement to be found was 
Muhammadiyah, which was established in Yogyakarta in 1912 under the leadership of 
Ahmad Dahlan (1868-1923). The movement was established in response to the 
humiliating conditions that Muslims found themselves in at the time, during which 
Islam came to be stigmatised not only among the aristocrats but also among the 
masses. Muhammadiyah was also found in response to the condition in which Islam 
came to be regarded as a religious and cultural anachronism unsuited to modem times 
(Van der Kroef 1954, 73). 
Encouraged by his enthusiasm to reform the religion, Ahmad Dahlan went to 
Mecca in 1890 where he studied for several years. He returned home with the idea of 
religious reformation inspired by Muhammad Abduh of Egypt and established the 
movement which was aimed at improving religious education exclusively for 
Muslims. The movement was also active in social work by establishing hospitals and 
social welfare bodies through which they propagated the reformist ideas of Islam. In 
social welfare agencies the movement's ethical emphasis found an expression. 
Through these kinds of activities the movement emancipate and liberate the individual 
Muslim. 
The chief characteristic of Muhammadiyah Islamic reform was that it appealed 
and tended to reflect the· aspirations of an Islamic bourgeoisie (Van der Kroef 1954, 
74), a rising Muslim middle class for whom the progressive rationalism and the 
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emphasis upon social welfare seemed an ideal adjustment of their faith to modem ! 
times. This constituted part of the movement norms which I call "puritan Islamism". 
Ahmad Dahlan was previously a member of Budi Utomo movement (Ricklefs 
1993, 171). Being a member ofBudi Utomo, Ahmad Dahlan's idealism must more or 
less have reflected the norm of Bureaucratic Populism of the priyayi. The result was 
that, in the towns and cities of Java the Muhammadiyah attracted many priyayi 
intellectuals and bureaucrats, particularly those who were more tolerant in outlook. 
Thanks to its ubiquitous norms, the Muhammadiyah, which was originally Javanese, 
attracted many members not only from the urban Javanese people but also non-
Javanese urban, particularly the Minangkabaus of Sumatra, from which it spread 
widely to the other urban areas of Sumatra, Kalimantan and Sulawesi. 
The fact that the Muhammadiyah reflected some of the priyayi 's norms of 
Bureaucratic Populism and lacked the norms of popular or traditional Islamism, 
resulted in it being restricted to the urban people only. In Java for example, the 
Muhammadiyah's ideas took strongest root only in urban townships of the coastal 
region leaving the interior where the peasantry are to be found especially in central 
and east Java untouched. 
Because it lacked the norms of popular or traditional Islamism and due to its 
purification efforts, the Muhammadiyah criticised many customs which pious Muslim 
Javanese had believed for centuries to be the true Islam. The result was that the 
Muhammadiyah's growth was slow. Further, it faced opposition from the old 
fashioned Islamic teachers of the countryside, from the recognised religious 
hierarchies as well as from pious communities who rejected the Muhammadiyah's 
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modernist ideas. In its early years Muhammadiyah thus brought much hostility rather 
than betterment to the religious community, particularly of Java. 
Despite all the shortcomings the Muhammadiyah had indeed marked a new 
foundation that more precision Islam being laid well. Perhaps it was only in the time 
when the movement was found that Islam definitively arrived to crystallise into an 
aggressive counter-tradition. 
Politically, its conception for the ideals of the state is quite difficult to trace. 
All we can say is that the movement is chiefly characterised by its tendency to reflect 
the aspirations of an Islamic bourgeoisie, a rising Muslim middle class, for whom J 
progressive rationalism and the emphasis upon social welfare seemed an ideal 
adjustment of their faith to modern times. It also reflected the norms of Bureaucratic 
Populism of the priyayi in addition to its own norm of puritan Islamism with the 
nationalistic implication of the movement lying in its arousal of self-consciousness 
and anti-Dutch feeling among its members (Sievers 1974,152). 
C. The Nahdatul Ulama ': Islamic Traditionalism 
Another major Muslim santri movement was found m 1926 called the Nahdatul 
ulama (NU). Unlike the Muhammadiy~, the NU is traditionalist. Equally the NU 
was found under the influence of some Middle Eastern ideas of reformism, 
particularly Wahhabism. The immediate agent of this process is the pilgrimage 
(haJjis) to Mecca. Upon their return from the Holy Land the more earnest among the 
HaJj'is founded educational religious boarding schools called the pesantren to instruct 
young men in what they took to be the true and neglected teaching of the Prophet. 
However, if the puritan Islamism of Muhammadiyah control the north-south 
coast Javanese regions, in the Javanese interior the NU is more dominant. The NU 
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ideas are widely accepted by the people in the interior thanks to its norms of "Islamic 
traditionalism" which represents the people's basic religious creed. The pesantren 12 
institutions are the primary means used by the NU to propagate their ideas of religious 
reform through the acquisition of certain desirable character and trait. Also through 
the development of a proper philosophy of life, manners, polish and restrain together 
with the accumulation and retention of factual knowledge or saleable vocational skills. 
Hundreds of pesantrens had been established throughout the island of Java. The imam 
of the pesantren is called a kyai. 13 From the Javanese sage the kyais are the leaders of 
the santri pesantren communities as well as any community or anyone who has been 
educated in the pesantren at any time in his life, or anyone who sympathises with the 
sentiments fostered by the pesantrens. 
The NU kyais stiffly resisted the inroads of non-Islamic political idealism. 
Encouraged by a new religious orthodoxy they used the unsettled times- to propagate 
their own political views, notably those which advocated the establishment of the 
Ummat Islam, an all-Moslem state and society based on Islamic law, the Sharia 
(Cribb 1995, 53). 
12 As was explained, pesantren is an Islamic religious school where the santri communities are 
supposed to learn Islam. The word pesantren itself is derived from the word santri. As a matter of 
fact, most of pesantrens are not established by NU as a collectivity or organisation, but by individuals 
who happened to be members of the NU. There are two kinds of pesantren. One is pesantren 
traditional, the other is pesantren modern. Most of NU pesantrens are traditional. They are called 
traditional because unlike the modern pesantren, they follow a very traditional and rigid way of 
teaching Islamic sciences. The modern pesantren follow a "modern" and interpretative method of 
teaching Islamic knowledge. Modern pesantren also teaches history, foreign languages like English, 
geography and so on. 
13 Following the distinction between pesantren traditional and pesantren modern, there are two kinds 
of kyai. One is kyai traditional (a leader of pesantren traditional), and the other is kyai modern (a 
leader of pesantren modern). Kyai traditional are rural in outlook and traditional in thought. Kyai 
modern by contrast are modern in outlook, and often more dynamic. 
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As nationalism began to grow more strongly among the santris the split along 
the lines of the traditionalist NU and the modernist Muhammadiyah became apparent. 
The traditionalist conservative elements were led by a coalition of the rural Qur'anic 
teachers and larger Muslim landholders while the modernist elements were led by a 
coalition of the leaders of the santri bureaucracy. The modernists were heavily 
influenced by the ideas of the reformists scholars in the intellectual centre of the 
Muslim world Cairo which tended to be urban, while the former group was influenced 
by Mecca, and tended to be more rural. 
To this end, there are three main santri movements being discussed here. 
These are Sarekat Islam, Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama. Sarekat Islam was a 
political party set up partly as a response to the Chinese competition and partly as a 
response to the growing dissatisfaction with Dutch rule. Its norm is what I have called 
Islamic Salvationism. The second is Muhammadiyah which is more a charitable 
movement than a political party. Its vigorous Islamic reformist doctrines which 
opposed ritualism and syncretism stimulated antagonism between them and the more 
conservative rural Qur'anic teachers of the kyais as well as the fanatic priyayi and 
abangan. Its norm is Puritan Islamism with a little flavour of Bureaucratic Populism. 
The third is the Nahdatul Ulama, the conservative organisation with a very large 
membership whose kyais were making political demand that the state be based on a 
rigid understanding of Islamic law. Their norm is an Islamic Traditionalism. These 
norms of Puritan Islamism and Islamic Traditionalism constitute the norm of -what I 
call Islamic Universalism. Thus around the 1930's three santri nationalist 
organisations had appeared on the scene. The first is a non-cooperative political party 
that agitated for certain amount of political -and to a lesser extent- economic reform 
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(Sarekat Islam). The second is an enthusiastically modernist social organisation 
engaged in various kinds of charitable activities (Muhammadiyah), and the third is a 
less dynamic but larger conservative group with hundreds of educational institutions 
(the NU). The traditionalist NU seemed to have the vision that the state ought to be (J 
an out-and-out orthodox Muslim state. The modernist Muhammadiyah believed thatA:) 
the state could be either a religiously oriented middle-class culture with certain 
qualified liberalistic-rationalistic overtones, or it could mean modernism, socialism 
and some opposition to "archaic" Islam. And the SI, seemed to believe that the state 
should be an "Islamised" Western democratic state. 
Another development, prompted by the contemplation among the santris to 
end the antagonism between the NU and the Muhammadiyah, was the decline of the 
controversies between the orthodox and the modernist wings in the mid 30's. This 
was partly as a result of Islamic leadership being progressively isolated from both 
political and cultural development and facing an increasingly hostile treatment from 
both colonial regime and non-santri groups. Both wings of the NU and 
Muhammadiyah began to accept that whatever their differences they were united in 
their devotion to Islam. In September 193 7 leaders of the NU and the 
Muhammadiyah took the initiative in order to create the Majlis Islam A 'la Indonesia 
(Supreme Islamic Council of Indonesia, MIAI). Other Islamic organisations 
throughout Indonesia including Sarekat Islam virtually joined to represent the ultimate 
union of major Islan1ic movements. In October 1943 when Indonesia was under 
Japanese occupation MIAI was dissolved and replaced by Masjumi (Majlis Syuro 
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Indonesia, Consultative Council of Indonesia). 14 This ultimate union of many major 
Islamic parties into a single Masjumi party has by no means led to greater religious 
unity among Indonesian Muslims. Indeed within that umbrella, the modernist 
Muhammadiyah continued to embrace most of the tenets of Islamic modernism 
according which the state could be based on anything as long as it supported the need 
to restore the original purity of Islam. The centre right-wing of the NU continued to 
envisage a traditionalist vision as the groundwork of an orthodox all-Muslim state. 
The Muhammadiyah doctrine of puritan Islamism and the NU norm of Islamic 
traditionalism that met in the political party of Masjumi, gave birth to a new political 
doctrine. Among its doctrine was the party's goals to implement the teaching of the 
Prophet and the law of Islam in the life of individuals, society and the Indonesian 
Republican state (Cribb 1995, 52). Masyumi's leaders from both Muhammadiyah and 
NU shared the belief that the state should be guided by the ethics of Islam in 
formulating policy. In doing so, Masjumi had evolved a fairly consistent program as 
to what a Muslim Indonesian state would be like. In the first place it would foster the 
closest possible connection between religious law and secular law. They thus 
recognised the freedom of religion as the fundamental principle of the state, 15 which 
meant that the Muslim should be free to practice their religious imperative, and they 
would respect the freedom of other faiths. Religious tolerance thus became the very 
basis of this party. This principle was expressed in the so-called Piagam Jakarta16 
14 For more detail and a sophisticated discussion on Masjumi, its leaders, and political vision, see 
Herbert Feith's The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. pp 134-8. However, when 
Masjumi was formed it included all the major schools of Islamic social and political thought in 
Indonesia because it inherited both the name and the organisational framework of an umbrella Islamic 
organisation. By 1952 most of the Muslim traditionalists of the NU withdrew from it. 
15 Robert Cribb and Colin Brown had somehow argued along this line. See Cribb's Indonesia: A 
Hisl0t)1 Since 1945, pp 52-3 
16 The main text of Piagam Jakarta read " ... that the state is to be based upon "belief in God" with the 
obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law". The charter was strongly opposed by the 
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(The Jaka1ia Charter), that subsequently became a source of a bitter disagreement 
between Muslims and the state in later years. 
The Revolutionarv Abanganism 
The priyayi and the santri have a particular characteristic with regards to their norms, 
order, ideology, and particular sort of structure. But as regards the abangans, their 
norms, order, ideology and structure are vague, inconsistent and incomplete in outline. 
It is not clear what sort of normative, ideological and structural standards the abangan 
followed. It had been suggested though that it followed the theoretical doctrine of 
Marx and Lenin (Legge 1964, 131-34). Others suggested that it did not merely follow 
the icons of Marxism but translated them into a vocabulary which appealed more 
familiar to the Indonesians, especially to the Javanese (Geertz 1973, 245). In any 
case, I tend to argue that the norm of abangan is vague and inconsistent. I would call 
their norm a "Revolutionary Abanganism" which was characterised by being 
reactionist against any existing norms, including that of the priyayi and santri. This 
norm of revolutionary abanganism had slogans such as: the abolition of all social 
gradation, the establishment of the much-heralded social justice, a maximum of 
economic equality and the ultimate creation of a genuine classless society. 17 Not only 
Christians as well as by the non-santri Muslims. It was dropped by the government in 1945, allegedly 
under the pressure of Japanese occupation authority in Indonesia. However, when in 1965 a modernist 
Islamic political party called Parmusi (Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Indonesian Muslim Party) was 
established, the notion of Piagam Jakarta once again surfaced. The party urged the government to 
recognise the constitutional authority of the Piagam and thus of Islamic Law among Muslims. This 
proposal was rejected. It was only recently though that the government agreed that Muslims could 
implement Islamic Law in the area of family law. However, the recent implementation of Islamic 
family law had nothing to do with Piagam Jakarta. 
17 This is a slogan of the Communists. But my thesis is that the communism was identical to the 
abanganism, and thus everything/everyone communist must be abangan, and vice versa. 
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did they demand political independence but also economic and individual 
independence from any class rule and economic hardship. 
At the grassroots level they never forwarded the concept of a common national 
identity, nationalism, or concept of national citizenship for the modern Indonesian 
state. They were more concerned with establishing a completely egalitarian social 
order (Van der Kroef 1954, 67). 
In addition, the abangan world view were not expressed through educational 
institutions, the fact that makes an effort to understanding their norm through their 
educational system become impossible. They were rather expressed themselves 
through the political movement of PK.I, Partai Komunis Indonesia, the Communist 
Party of Indonesia. 
Abangan revolutionary action against the other two social systems which often 
caused tense antagonism between them is easily documented. Historically, the 
resentment of the abangan against the priyayi ruling aristocracy and the santri trading 
class is obviously oflong standing (Geertz 1969, 170). But while the tension between 
the abangan and the priyayi was rather suffocating because of the general relativism of 
the two groups, the conflict between abangan and the santri was more severe. The 
· antagonism between abangan and santri had in fact started as early as the 16th 
century, since the conflict between the Hindu-Buddhist Central Javanese kingdom of 
Mataram and the north Islamic coast harbour kingdoms such as Demak, Gresik, and 
Surabaya (Geertz 1969, 170). 
In the history of modern Indonesia, in so far as the conflict between the santri 
and the abangan was focused on ideological patterns, the santri universalism and 
salvationism draw the relativistic abangan's fire. Muslim santris especially those 
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under the influence of the Islamic authority of the NU strongly refused to give any 
recognition to the abangan. Through religious institutions such as mosque, school, 
and pesantren, which not only has religious but also organisational influence as well, 
the santris who are subject to the highest Islamic authority of the NU can be easily 
mobilised in order to isolate the abangan. Theologically, the NU even sometimes 
accuse the abangan of being idol-worshippers. 
The fact that the abangan was isolated by the santri directed the abangan into 
the war against the santri in terms of a primordial struggle. This became more 
apparent when the abangan were associated with the PKI, which was known for its 
violent and illegitimate way of implementing action. Being affiliated with the PKI, 
the abangan received very little legitimacy from the santri and from the majority of · 
the people. 
III. Sukarno and the Institutionalisation of Norms 
In chapter II we explored the nature of the norms of the three social systems. In this 
chapter we will be dealing with the question of how these norms were integrated into 
the value system of Pancasila. 
The word value will be used here to describe the normative component of 
Pancasila. 
From our discussion above it becomes clear that there was a socio-religious 
split and antagonism within Indonesian community between santri, priyayi and 
abangan. As was explained the most important factor for this split and antagonism 
was the divergent structure of the norm-oriented system. The priyayi based their 
norm on Bureaucratic Populism, namely the amalgamation of Western Idealism, 
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Indonesian Nationalism, and Archaic Javanism. The santris based their norms on 
Islamic Universalism-Salvationism, as the Muhammadiyah on Puritan Islamism, the 
NU on Islamic Traditionalism and the SI on Islamic Salvationism. Abangans based 
their norm on a Revolutionary Abanganism inspired to some extent by the 
revolutionary doctrine of Leninism and Marxism. With their norms they were the 
contending streams of thought and culture that emerged about three decades or so 
before the independence. Each competed with the other in introducing their norms as 
the basis for the common national identity and the basis for the national rejuvenation 
in Indonesia. The priyayi stream was represented by Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa, 
the santri stream typified by SI, Muhamrnadiyah and NU, whereas the abangan was 
represented by a political party, PK.I. 
The emergence of Budi Utomo and Taman Siswa as the representatives of the 
priyayi, SI, Muhammadiyah and NU as the representatives of the santri, and PKI as 
the representative of abangan, more or less signified that at all levels Indonesia was 
abnormally susceptible to serious alienation based on -what Geertz called "religious" 
primordial attachment (1963, 109). That is to say that their association with a 
particular party or movement was stemmed from the "givenness" of socio-religious 
identity and existence, from the immediate religious and social intimacy. Namely, 
that they were "born into particular religious community". 
In addition to these representatives there was an extraordinary proliferation of 
new organisations among the educational elite most of which was based on ethnic 
identities. Sarekat Ambon (Ambon Association) for the Ambonese, Sarekat Pasundan 
(Pasundan Association) for the Sundanese, Sarekat Sumatra (Sumatra Association) for 
the Sumatrans, Kaum Betavi (Batavia Tribe) for the Jakartans and many others. The 
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birth of these groups not only reflected the new enthusiasm for an organisation but 
most importantly reflected the continuing strength of ethnic and race identities. Their 
existence only added to the uncertainty as to whether a common national identity 
shared by all Indonesians devoid of any particular race, ethnicity or religion was 
necessary or not. They only increased the sense of disunity among Indonesians. 
Instead of a sense of a shared national identity they prioritised ethnicity and they 
became concerned as to which ethnic group would lead the country. Instead of a 
general belief that Indonesians had to have something in common they preferred to 
focus on local identities. 
The fact remained that groups formed on ethnic or religious bases were 
virtually never considered as possible self-standing, maximal social units or as 
candidates for common nationhood. It had to be admitted though that some of these 
ethnic-based organisations were concerned with the aggregation of defined, specially 
outlined traditional primordial groups into larger more diffuse units, whose implicit 
frame of reference was not the local scene but the "nation" in the sense of the whole 
society. Nonetheless they remained discriminative especially when it came to the 
problem of a "common" identity. 
The very basic need that the nation was busy looking for, namely the need for 
a central common ground existing beyond ethnic-religious diversity remained lacking. 
Each of these social systems with their representatives and ideological ideals left this 
central issue unresolved and even further prevented the common identity from being 
present. 
Following this early period of search for national identity which was 
characterised with antagonism between the contending systems· and strean1s, Sukarno 
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(1901-70) emerged. In his hand, the idea of a national Indonesian identity devoid of a 
specific religious or regional ties had begun to be introduced. 18 
Sukarno had already occupied a position as the most dynamic political thinker 
in the colony since the late 1920's. 19 Unlike any other thinkers, his ideology was 
unique. It was an eclectic blend of all major norms, systems, and streams of thought 
in the emerging Indonesian movements.20 He was a genuine pan-Indonesian 
nationalistic leader who sought to create a culture above and beyond the orientations 
of abangan peasantry, priyayi elite, Muslim santri or any regional and cultural 
orientations. He was the leader that was aware from the beginning that in Indonesia 
none of the Islamic norms of Universalism-Salvationism, priyayi norms of 
Bureaucratic Populism, or the Revolutionary Abanganism, were to be regarded as 
effectively predominant norm, system or tradition.21 He undertook the task of 
searching for a national identity by taking up the task of blending and adapting those 
norms of the major existing social systems. Hence, Sukarno thought about Indonesia 
in more evaluative or selective terms rather than in a cognitive or discriminative way. 
He found justification for a form of nationalism which was devoid of any specific 
Islamic commitment or formal link to. a particular religious and ethnic group. He 
18 There are still a lot of things to be studied about Sukarno, especially that the new government of Mr 
Habibie had allowed Sukarno's major works to be republished. His works including Sarinah, 
Indonesia Menggugat (Indonesia Protesting), Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi (Under the Banner of 
Revolution), and Penyambung Lidah Rakyat (The People's Conveyer ). All these Sukarno's works 
were banned by Soeharto when the latter was in power for 32 years. 
19 Benjamin Higgins described Sukarno as a "symbol of continuity". See Higgins, 1963, 79. 
20 See Kahin's Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p 90 
21 Allen M. Sievers suggested that besides refusing to accept any exclusive idealism, Sukarno in fact 
appealed to "adat" as the basis for his ideology. See Sievers' The Mystical World of Indonesia: Culture 
and Economic Development in Conflict, p 21. Adat is a kind of local law but it has never been codified 
or standardised. It possessed the full force of law under the Dutch and was modified by the Dutch 
authority to suit their ends. By Sukarno adat was nationalised and it was from adat -as Sievers 
suggests- that Sukarno derived his doctrines of a national statecraft based on village patterns of 
governance. 
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absorbed priyayi and santri norms, considered revolutionary abanganism, and in 
addition, absorbed his own understanding of Western ideas into a unique synthesis 
which he found satisfactory to be a model for the Indonesian nation as a whole 
(Ricklefs 1993, 182). 
He was a son of a Javanese schoolteacher, a member of the lower rank of 
Javanese priyayi. He learnt something from the leader and the founder of the Islamic 
Union, the first mass nationalist organisation in Indonesia, H.O.S Tjokroaminoto 
(Kahin 1952, 90) from whom the future leaders of all wings, Islamist, Traditionalist, 
Nationalist and Marxist emerged. Sukarno was regularly in touch with 
Tjokroaminoto. Sukarno's first wife, Utary was Tjokroaminoto's daughter and it was 
by virtue of Tjokroaminoto indoctrination that Sukarno moved along a rising curve of 
ideological enthusiasm (Geertz 1968, 83). Sukarno was also under the influence of 
Taman Siswa's and Budi Utomo's ideals (Legge 1964, 132-33) as well as Tjipto 
Mangunkusumo's (1885-1943) and Douwes Del<l<er's (1879-1951) thought, who were 
the founders of the political nationalist party, The Indische Partij. 
When young Sukarno advocated ideas on Indonesian unity to unify the various 
norms, ethnic and religious cultures, criticised imperialism and colonialism, and urged 
non-co-operation with the colonial government in pursuing independence, he was 
readily accepted as a leader. In his hand emerged the concept of a common national 
system as an identity that he hoped would be able to unify the country by which any 
norms, systems, or doctrine would be subordinated to its set of values and ideals, 
hereby denying the existence of an exclusive system. Sukarno soon appeared to have 
achieved a relatively united front of the main Indonesian political, social and religious 
organisations. The representatives of the priyayi, santri and abangan as well as and 
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Christians joined him and found a body called PPPKI22 in 1928. The idea of an all-
Indonesian as a common denominator was now growing. The intellectual leaders of 
almost all systems, ethnic and regionalist groups, Christians and Chinese as well as 
Arab communities also endorsed this new initiative. 
The problem with PPPKI was that religious primordialism was still alive 
within it and even divided the movement. The unity achieved by PPPKI was thus 
becoming superficial. The santri withdrew from the organisation in 1930 because the 
other groups refused to give Islam the recognition that the Islamic leaders thought it 
deserved. The santri leadership could not accept the idea of "non-Islamic" 
nationalism that they thought to be the ideology of PPPKI. The reaction of the 
Islamic leadership was hostile. The Minangkabau Muslim thinker Muhammad Natsir 
(1908-94) for example, emerged in this period as a leading Islamic polemicist. In 
1931 Natsir wrote articles which argued that only Islam could be the basis of an 
Indonesian nationality. Muslims, he argued, must struggle for a state which would 
serve Islam and in which Islamic law and Muslim leaders would be dominant 
(Ricklefs 1993, 189). He was fundamentally unable to see how in a country where the 
majority was Muslim, anything other than Islam could seriously be proposed as the 
basis for national identity. Most traditional Muslims also, like the NU tended to see 
that PPPKI as "secular" and thus would eradicate the religious basis of the state and 
with it its Islamic basis. 
The Muslim santris felt alienated within the PPPKI. This caused conflict that 
resulted in political instability and chronic dissatisfaction within the movement. The 
22 Permufakatan Perhimpunan Politik Kebangsaan Indonesia (Union of Political Associations of the 
Indonesian People). This included: PNI, Partai Sarekat Islam, Budi Utomo, Pasundan, Sumatra Bond, 
and the Surabaya Study Club. 
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loose unity represented by PPPKI thus confirmed the idea that a nationalism devoid of 
regional or religious norms and ties was a possible basis for joint action. But this 
implied that join action would almost certainly bypass the Islamic groups who would 
therefore find themselves isolated from the main stream of political leadership. 
The next step to be taken by Sukarno23 after the failure of the PPPKI was to 
find a bridge that could link the gap between the various and conflicting groups. This 
bridge had to be not merely political, like PNI or PPPKI, but one that contained values 
and a symbolic force. The values had to include those that affect the most 
fundamental needs of individuals such as the needs for definition of individuals and 
the continuity of their norms, meaning and identity. The symbolic force had to play a 
mediator role in the society where religious primordial conflict tended to extend to 
over all the components and levels of society. It is thought that Sukarno must have 
encouraged a bridge that could mediate the particularistic norms on the one hand, and 
build an operative religo-political tool on the other. As far as the norms of the three 
social systems were concerned, Sukarno did not have any other choice but to 
combine those three alternatives. That is to say, to select or evaluate them together. 
He was forced to invent preconditions and a medium where communication between 
these alternatives was possible. This medium had to be formed from a constellation 
of norms of various alternatives in such a way that not only could the contending 
23 Three phases of Sukarno's thought are fairly distinguished: 
I. Confrontial agitation against Dutch colonialism characterised by mass mobilisation. An example of 
this, is his involvement in mobilising the youth in Jakarta in 28 October I 928 in which the notorious 
Sumpah Pemuda was announced. 
2. The establishment of political party and other movements such as PNI and PPPKI. 
3. Contemplation that led him to the establishment of a Cultural System of Pancasila. A core value 
that meets the norms of various groups and identities. The step mentioned above represents the third 
phase of Sukarno's thought. 
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groups communicate, but also that they should react appropriately to each other's 
norms. Finally, on 20 June 1949 he announced the finding of Pancasila.24 
At least two decades before Pancasila was born Sukarno had already shown an 
inclination toward the necessity of a bridge such as Pancasila. In 28 October 1928 for 
example, he joined and even led the cultural and political trend towards Indonesian 
communalism and collectivistic consciousness formally known as a youth congress 
held in Batavia, now Jakarta. In its youth pledge (Sumpah Pemuda) the congress 
adopted three ideas: One father land, Indonesia; One nation, Indonesia; and One 
language, Bahasa Indonesia. Sukarno's involvement in such trends clearly marks his 
intellectual phase centred around the need to create a "single" country, and to 
synthesise the norms of the contending political camps -Islamist, Marxist, mid 
Nationalist (Geertz 1968, 85); namely santri, priyayi, and abangan camps. 
In Pancasila such synthesis is positively to be found. In it the motivations of 
the three social systems are integrated within the normative pattern. There is in the 
normative pattern of the Five Principles of Pancasila -Belief in One God, Nationalism, 
Humanitarianism, Democracy, and Social Justice- something for everyone that is 
suitably distributed; for santri, for abangan and for priyayi, for Muslims, and non-
Muslims, for Javanese, and non-Javanese. 
Sukarno devoutly saw himself as the exemplar of this sort of ideological 
integration. He once said that "I am a follower of Karl Marx, but I am also a religious 
man so I can grasp the entire range between Marxism and theism... I know all the 
trends and understand them ..... I have made myself the meeting place of all trends and 
ideologies. I have blended, blended, and blended them until finally they became the 
24 This particular day is celebrated annually throughout Jndonesia as the Day of the Birth of Pancasila. 
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present Sukarno" (Gee1iz 1968, 85). On the other occasion he was reported to have 
said: 
"l have no preference for one party over another. I introduce the term socialism in 
this book in the general sense, without seeking to establish any connection with the 
opinions or programs of one party or another. The ideals of socialism are not 
monopoly of one party, and not the property of some other group. Long before the 
present parties existed, long before the beginning of our revolution, yes, long before 
the beginning of the war in the Pacific, which made our revolution possible, did the 
ideals of socialism fill the hearts of many convinced members of the Indonesian 
movement". Again he said "I am a nationalist, but I am also attached to socialism, 
because my thinking tells me that man and the world can reach a state of well-being 
only in socialism. And I am attached to socialism because I am attached to Islam" 
(Van der J(roef 1954, 103-4). 
By inventing Pancasila, Sukarno was thus oriented to the attainment of certain 
ends, motivated to optimise gratification, behaving in a situation of various objects, 
and governed by certain culture of values. He expected that the three religiously 
oriented social systems had mutual expectations and views one another as sources of -
what Parsons calls "need-gratification" and control. The situation was thus apt to 
produce some interaction based on mutual respect. Norms and cognitive orientations 
became institutionalised in common value based on mutual expectations and respect. 
Religious, cultural and social pluralism were then not to be regarded as the source of 
conflict but as the immediate, concrete and meaningful natural diversity, as the 
substantial content of Indonesian individuality. 
By Pancasila, Sukarno did not mean to subordinate the norms of particularistic 
identifications of social systems in favour of an unclear generalised commitment, nor 
to an overarching alien civil order or even worse in favour of any particular system or 
religion. Rather, by Pancaila he meant to integrate them together into one unified 
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system of values. He seemed to be quite aware though that by subordinating them 
was to risk a loss of common national identity of Pancasila. Theoretically therefore, 
in the cosmic order of Pancasila, Indonesian society must be built on -what Geertz 
called- a "fellow feeling". A feeling of a corporate sentiment of oneness, a feeling of 
"consciousness of kind", which binds religiously diverse people together and 
overrides all differences and conflicts. Thus Pancasila constitutes a new Indonesian 
identity (Sastrapratedja 1996, 149) according to which a citizen is an Indonesian first 
and only secondly santri, priyayi, abangan, Javanese, Minangkabau, Batak, Muslim, 
Christian and so on. The ideology of the country was not to be based on a particular 
norm, religion or doctrine but on the ideology of Pancasila, the ideology of all 
Indonesians in the interest of a maximum unity among Indonesia's cultural, religious 





Pancasila as a Cultural System 
"Action consists of the structures and processes by which human 
beings form meaningful intentions and; more or less successfully, 
implement them in concrete situations. The word "meaningful" 
implies the symbolic or cultural level of representation and 
reference". Parsons, Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative 
Perspectives, p. 5. 
Cultural system, " ... .is constituted by values and symbols by which 
the interaction occur among members of the state. A cultural 
system is also pattern of culture whose different parts are 
interrelated to form value system, and systems of expressive 
symbols. Parsons, Values, Motives, and Systems of Action, p. 55 
Having answered the questions as to what the norms of the three social systems are 
and how they were institutionalised by Sukarno in a united system of Pancasila, in this 
chapter we are concerned with the question of what the elements of Pancasila are. 
While in the previous part the approach being used was historical, in this part 
the approach is cultural. What I mean by a cultural approach is that culture should be 
taken into account when explaining the elements of the common values of Pancasila 
through which the society is devised to be integrated. The word "culture" implies the 
system of value as well as symbol. 
I hope it can be clearly understood that the framework of our analysis in the 
previous part utilised the basic scheme of "action theory" in which the important 
components are norms and organisational dimensions. Educational institutions are 
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included into the schema of organisational dimension. From our discussion on these 
two dimensions of norm and organisation two levels of conflict were thus explored: 
a) Norm-oriented conflict by which we meant conflict about basic assumptions as to 
what norms were to be the basis of the state. Namely, what sort of norms would be 
acceptable to be the common identity of the Indonesian state. We have explained that 
there were three social systems with distinct norms, santri, abangan and priyayi. They 
were treated as a discriminative system simply because they defined the whole society 
in terms of their own primordialism and thus denied the existence of others. We also 
saw them as primary variances that reflected the basic religious primordial differences 
in Indonesia. 
Besides the notion of primordial difference we have also briefly conferred 
another key issue, namely the notion of (religious) primordial affiliation which was 
referred to as a religious and normative givennes that stems from the "given" religious 
or social identity and existence as well as from the immediate religious and social 
intimacy. We assumed that as a result of the social systems being discriminative the 
basic consensus on the definition of community was lacking, namely the consensus of 
what and whose norms were to prevail. . 
b) Organisational-oriented conflict. We explained some nationalist organisations and 
movements. We assumed that all those organisations and movements were nationalist 
in a broad sense although only some declared nationalism to be their central 
ideological principles. Beyond these organisations and movements with their 
exclusive systems and norms came Pancasila. It institutionalised the existing 
contending norms of particularly the three cognitive-discriminative social systems 







In the what follows, I will discuss the notion of cultural system of Pancasila . 
This cultural system of Pancasila will be discussed at two primary levels. Namely, 
Pancasila as an evaluative system (set of values, meaning, and ideas) and Pancasila as 
a symbolic system. The starting point of the discussion is the Parsonian conception of 
cultural system. Bellah's model of American Civil Religion will also simultaneously 
be involved in order to get a more sophisticated understanding of Pancasila. Geertz's 
conception of symbolic system will also be used. However, Bellah and Geertz are 
employed in order to avoid the mechanistic explanation of Parsonian functionalism. 
I. Pancasila as Evaluative System 
With regard to the notion of common national identity my argument is that m 
Indonesia, as a result of ideological, social and religious tension, selective or 
evaluative normative orientation by which stable interaction between various norms 
can be produced, was needed. This selective normative orientation was needed 
because it is fundamental to the nation without which the stable system essential to 
the stability and integration, could not exist. 
I also argue that in all societies the more stable and more effective patterns of 
identity are those which are shared in common by the members of society. That is to 
say, that in order to be effective as a facilitator of interaction between various and 
contending norms and as a means of social stability, an identity must consist of 
"culture" in which the particularity of a specific norm is transcended in terms of the 
communality of the normative common value. This value should be one in which the 
maintenance of social stability lies, and by which "communication" between the 
contending groups is possible. In addition, it should function as a precondition for 
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reciprocity and complementary of expectations, and as a prerequisite for a system to 
operate, and nourish the ideal of a common collectivity that raised the political, social, 
and religious ends of society to a new prominence. Besides normative common value, 
a symbolic force is also needed. A symbol that is socially structured and designed to 
avoid any primordial identity from existing and which represents the integration of the 
existing religious, cultural, and political meanings of different systems. The existence 
of this kind of value and symbol system is the closest possible alternative as certain 
norm is determined by the existence of other norm. 
However, the collection of these values in Pancasila is called an evaluative 
pattern or evaluative system of Pancasila to which we are now turning our discussion. 
They are called evaluative because they evaluate or select various norms and put them 
together in one united system of values. 
In the evaluative system of Pancasila, there are Five Silas or Principles. They 
are: (1) Belief in One God (2) Nationalism (3) Humanity (4) Democracy and (5) 
Social Justice/Equality. They were enunciated by Sukarno on 20 June 1945 and were 
included in the Preamble to the Indonesian Constitution of 1945.25 These values are 
designed to be the shared common values crucial to the effective functioning and 
continued integration of the society. 
This notion of shared common values however, more than any others, 
connects the notion of Pancasila to the conceptional framework of common value/core 
introduced by both Parsons (19 51 ), Bellah (197 5), and to a lesser extent Geertz 
(1963). In their study of American society, Parsons and Bellah -following Durkheim-
25 The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Fourth Reprint of 1968 edition. Department of 
Information, Republic of Indonesia. Jakarta: Percetakan Negara RI, p 5 
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took for granted that in order for a society to remain viable it required a set of 
common values (as well as symbols) that served as a focus for moral integration. 
Parsons and Bellah furthermore, shared a common concern in their formulation of a 
system of value (Parsons 1951, Bellah 1975). They both believed that the sharing of . 
common value patterns entailed a sense of belonging, created a solidarity among those 
mutually oriented to the common values, and that without attachment to the 
constitutive common values the collectivity tends to dissolve. 
Most importantly, they believed that the sets of common value must be 
invested with "religious significance" if the system was to work effectively as a 
system of integration. Bellah specifically, more emphatically stressed that "any 
coherent and viable society rests upon a common set of moral understandings about 
good and bad, right and wrong, in the realm of individual and social action. These 
-common moral understanding must also rest in turn upon a common set of religious 
understandings that provide a picture of the universe in terms of which the moral 
understandings make sense (Bellah 1975, ix). 
Following this argument, I would argue that Pancasila as a common value 
began in the first place in Sukarno's political and religious thinking. It is a unique 
achievement of Sukarno in a religio-political culture to alter hitherto ethnically and 
religiously divided community into one society. I also argue that Sukarno was 
determined to observe certain religious norms, political standards, and cultural criteria 
for selection and evaluation. It is likely though, that the institutionalisation of the first 
"sila" of Belief in One God was a result of his profound religious thinking. So much 
so that the other four silas were likely as a result of his contemplation of political and · 
cultural phenomena. 
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The evaluation of different religious, political and cultural norms into one 
value system of Pancasila indicates, in the first place that the norms of the three social 
systems are irrelevant unless they are Pancasila-ised. They are irrelevant because in 
general and abstract terms it could be said that those norms were incompatible with 
the most elementary form of social order. That is to say that there was guarantee that 
such norms would not include a recognition of other people's norms as valuable. The 
existence of such norms as the latter would result therefore in the relations between 
individuals within society being resolved into a struggle for power. This would in 
tum cause what Marion J. Levy called "a war of all against all" (1952). 
In so far, as Pancasila introduces a common evaluative system for all, this 
system defines how the relations between members of a community ought to be. It 
lays down values determining these relations in religious as well other political, 
cultural, and social terms. When we discuss the first principle of Belief in One God, it 
will be clear how Pancasila defines the relationship between individuals especially in 
religious terms. 
Let me now explain in brief the five values of Pancasila.26 The first value is 
Belief in One God. Alongside with · other silas, the first sila is included in the 
Preamble of the 1945 Constitution. The preamble states that " .... the structure of 
Indonesia's National Independence shall be formulated in a Constitution of the 
Indonesian state which shall have the structural state form of a Republic of Indonesia 
with sovereignty of the people, and which shall be based upon: Belief in One, 
S G d ,,27 upreme o ..... 
26 This explanation is derived from Alwi Dahlan's and Cris D. Waelan's Pancasi/a: A Brief 
Introduction. 
27 The 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. Fourth Reprint of 1968 edition. Department of 
Information, Republic oflndonesia. Jakarta: Percetakan Negara Rl, p 5 
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This religious sila can be regarded as a spiritual side of Pancasila. It tells us 
that there is a religious quality in Pancasila. Being the first sila it tells us moreover 
that belief in the existence of God occupies a central p-lace in Indonesian society. No 
doubt then that belief in one God stands out as a fundamental tenet of Indonesian 
society. While Pancasila proposed concerns to the values of humanitarianism, 
democracy, national unity, and social justice, the bottom line of all these values must 
be necessarily belief in the existence of God. Other values must be dependent on the 
value of Belief in One God. 28 The sila thus coheres around the Indonesian national 
life and symbol. 
The sila of Belief in One God is also more than merely a locus of, say political 
decision. It provides religious meaning and belonging. It certainly came out of an 
uncertain religious status quo, namely from a situation where basic religious 
agreement on the religious value premises of the society was absent and from a 
situation where basic religious distrust among the members of society could not be 
prevented. It is obviously an answer to the coincidence of religious primordial 
sentiments that tend to transform the conflict into an extreme emotional response and 
even violent action. 
The simplest political meaning of this religious sila is that the country is not to 
be based on a particular religious faith or norm. It is not to be based on, say the faith 
of Islam, nor on the norm of santri, priyayi, and abangan. This principle stipulates 
that Indonesians should religiously respec~ their fellow citizens even if they have 
different religious belief. This value is in addition a proclamation that Indonesia is 
28 Penyegaran Pengamalan Pancasila: Memperingati Kesaktian Pancasila 1 Oktober 1965. LPSI 
Online, edisi, 04 Oktober 1997. http://www.lpsi.org (No author mentioned) 
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"religious" state, namely a state that is based on a religious value (Ramage 1995, 14) 
but not on a particular religious dogma. This implies that while not antithetical to, 
and indeed sharing in common: with the doctrine of existing religions, Pancasila did 
not prioritise any sects or specific religion. Pancasila was never militantly secular, 
and simultaneously rejected radical secularism because it is empty of religious 
meanmg. It was also never anti-clerical and at the same time rejected militant 
religious triumphalism, because it provides too much religious meaning for too few. 
Instead, Pancasila borrows from the religious traditions and expresses them in an 
Indonesian vocabulary as the first principle of Pancasila. 
The question remains though, which God does Pancasila refer to in the first 
sila, the sila of Belief in One God, Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa? Despite the 
significance important of the sila, these few words are rich in ambiguity, and are 
marvellously difficult to be understood. They are quite general and at the same time 
risky statements. They are broad enough to encompass particularly a wide variety of 
major religions including Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. 
Consequently, while this sila occupies a central role in Pancasila, it also constitutes a 
source of further considerable controversy and even conflict among people. More 
orthodox Muslims for example problematised the usage of the word Tuhan (means 
God) in Ketuhanan. They have frequently favoured an explicit commitment to the 
word Allah instead of Tuhan (Morfit 1981, 840). What God does the Pancasila refer 
to? Is it the God of non-Muslim, since the word being used is Tuhan not Allah? Is it 
the God of Muslims since the God referred to is one? Or is it something else? What 
is apparent is that "God" here is not the God of Muslims since, the proper Arabic 
designation of Allah does not appear at all and there is also no commitment to submit 
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the state to the will of Allah. It is also not God of the Christians because the word Esa 
(which means one, namely One God) is there. 
To answer this question one needs to consider the wider context in which the 
first sila and the use of the word Ketuhanan occurred. The previous part explained the 
context in which the first sila occurred and was institutionalised. To summarise, 
suffice is to say that proposals declaring Islam or any other particular religion and 
norm as the basis of the state were seen as divisive by other religious groups or other 
normative systems. This means that Islam could hardly be accepted as the basis for 
the common identity of the state, in the same way that there would be hardly a 
commitment to submit the state to the will of Allah. The use of the word tuhan 
instead of Allah is likely meant to avoid an assumption that Indonesian identity is an 
Islamic identity. 
Second, we need to bear in mind the wider Indonesian assumptions about the 
nature of religion and its association with the notion of national identity. Here I will 
not emphatically define what religion is. Suffice to say that religion -following 
Clifford Geertz (1966)- is a system of symbolic forms that give profound expression 
to the fundamental nature of existence and serve to orient individuals and 
communities to their world. While I will not deliberately explain or comment on this 
very broad definition of religion, one thing for sure is that this definition does not 
presume or deny the objective truth of any given religious system. Its value is that it 
permits examination of the way people in a given society find ultimate meaning in 
their world. I will not also demonstrate here a detailed consideration of the social and 
historical context in which a religion evolved. We have dealt with that question in the 
past chapters and we have somehow explained that a religion is something that does 
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not exist ex nihilo. We have for example, examined the rise of Buddhism/Hinduism 
and explained how they were adapted into the Indonesian set up. We have also 
discussed Islam and its response to the social and historical conditions including the 
influence of the previous religions, namely Buddhism and Hinduism. 
Agama is the Indonesian word for religion. This word derives from sanskrit29 
and was imported along the early Indonesian-Indian trade routes. Hinduism and 
Buddhims were the official religions of the Indonesian empires before the widespread 
of Islam. The early Muslim preachers adopted the concept of agama and other 
elements of Hindu and Buddhist culture to validate the elements of Islam particularly 
when they had to preach in the predominantly Hindus-Buddhists areas. Interestingly, 
the early Hindus, Buddhists and Muslims in their interaction with one another assume 
the agamas of Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism as being tolerant in their very nature 
(Atkinson 1988, 48-51). 
A latter Muslims intensified the respect for religion through its universalism 
and the supreme importance it placed upon the Holy Qur'an. What is more, Islam 
brought with it a sharp distinction between a Muslim and "people of the Book", 
namely Christians and Jews. 
Nowadays, while the overwhelming majority of the population are Muslims, 
agama Islam live socially and historically hand in hand with non-agama Islam as in 
the past and at present. Agama Islam respects religious freedom for those belonging 
to other faiths. In this context Muslim's demand that the country be based on the 
Shariah does not mean that Muslims do not respect religious freedom, nor does it 
29 Sanskrit is an old Indian language. And it was the official language of the Hindu-Buddhist priests 
and scholars of the old Javanese royal court, in the time of Hindu-Buddhism colonialism in Java. 
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mean that Muslims do not recognise the existence of other faiths. In principle, 
Muslims are tolerant toward religious minorities. However, this is not to say that 
Muslims are tolerant toward such "belief' as Kebatinan (Javanese mysticism). Their 
tolerance applies only to those systems of belief already recognised as world religions 
such as Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism. 
This denotes then, that the God in the first sila is more associated with the 
principle of religious tolerance, rather than with a God of love, a God of salvation, or 
a God of a metaphysical order. The fact that all Indonesians believe in Tuhan (God) 
albeit in different ways, can symbolise this religious tolerance, unity and corporation. 
Hence the God referred to is not the Muslim God nor Christian God but rather 
the God of religious tolerance. Thus in the formulation of this sila what is meant by 
Belief in One God, is belief in "one" version of religious tolerance. Accordingly, this 
sila asserts that while each religion is allowed to proclaim its highest insights, it must 
preserve humble and contrite recognition of the fact that all religious faith are also 
right. This tenet of religious tolerance is expressed in the Pancasila's doctrine as 
"semua agama itu benar", which means that "all religions are right". This doctrine 
created a spirit of tolerance and made any religious movement hesitant to claim 
official validity for its own or to demand an official monopoly for its cult. Thus the 
essential religious value of the first sila is religious tolerance, the value that resembles 
what Reinhold Niebuhr have called a "religious solution of a religious problem" 
(Niebuhr 1954, 134-35). 
By interpreting God as essentially religious tolerance we have indeed 
understood God in Pancasila from the point of view of a socio-political image rather 
than from a religious or theological perspective. Interpreting God as religious 
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tolerance is understandable for we are linking the God of Pancasila with other terms 
such as the notion of agama within the framework of common national identity. This 
certainly affects not only the theological interpretation of God but also sociological 
explanations of God. At the sociological level, this interpretation of God as religious 
tolerance is based -among other things- on an argument that Pancasila is a way of 
constructing through symbols and rituals an ultimate meaning and direction for 
religious activity of "all religions" and not of a particular religion. Nonetheless, 
although we interpret God as religious tolerance the fact remains that social images 
can have theological relevance in the same manner that theological image can have 
social and political relevance. When we interpret God as religious tolerance therefore, 
it shows that we think of religious tolerance as important thing as God. Similarly, 
when religious tolerance is described in Pancasila as Belief in One God it shows that 
religious tolerance is the ultimate religious value in Pancasila. -
The second sila is humanitarianism, Kemanusiaan yang Adil dan Beradab, 
which means Just and Virtuous Humanitarianism. A commitment to this value entails 
a willingness to treat others in a fair manner, free from suspicion, exploitation and 
oppression. This value also reinforces the respect for the dignity of all people and 
their right to be free from physical and spiritual oppression. It recognises the equality 
of all individuals in terms of rights and responsibilities, without discrimination. The 
rights of individuals are respected as well as the rights of the community. 
The third value is Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian Unity. This is the 
principle of national unity which expresses a commitment to the unity of Indonesia. It 
is in this value that the concept of nationalism, unity and integrity of the vast and 
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diverse island nation is embodied. This value puts the interest of the nation as the 
common interest of all Indonesians above the interest of individuals or groups. 
The fourth principle emphasises the idea of a people led by wise policies 
arrived at through a process of consultation and consensus (Kerakyatan yang 
Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan dalam Permusyawaratan!Perwakilan). This 
principle means that Pancasila calls for democracy uniquely through mutual 
deliberation to reach consensus, whereby the majority always have to take into 
consideration and respect the needs of the minority. 30 
The fifth principle expresses .a commitment to social justice for all 
Indonesians, Keadilan Social bagi Seluruh Rakyat Indonesia, Social Justice for All 
Indonesian citizens. This principle is concerned with an equitable society in which 
the fruits of economic development could be enjoyed by everybody including the 
poor. 
By looking at these five principles one can easily see that the Pancasila's 
values have something for everyone. They are an articulation of inclusive norms in 
which the various members of other systems of norms can easily accept them jointly. 
They are in other words, oriented toward -what Parsons called- collective 
gratification. Moreover, they appeal constructively to Indonesians to build a nation 
based on harmonious values. Ultimately, Pancasila is not only to be thought of as a 
system of integration (Moerdiono 1996, 40-3) but also as a system that is designed to 
achieve an ultimate end. This end is: that Pancasila is devised to guide people 
30 We are not concerned here with the notion of how Pancasila defines democracy or what kind of . 
democracy Pancasila follows. Suffice to say is that Pancasila democracy is understood in terms of 
Soeharto's democracy. It is not liberal democracy but is what they call a "Guided Democracy", which 
technically means a dictated democracy. Guided Democracy also means that Soeharto has an absolute 
rule to dictate his people and abuse his power. 
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towards the achievement of a just, prosperous, and blissful society (Poespowardojo 
1996, 45). Talking about the notion of the integration of norms, insofar as these 
ultimate ends are concerned, the integration as well as the relation between members 
of the community is understandable in terms of the five values of Pancasila. 
In essence, the system of Pancasila is associated particularly with the notion of 
mutual assistance or what is commonly known as gotong royong. In terms of the 
latter, the system of Pancasila orients the objects in terms of mutual expectations. The 
essential property of such co-operation is mutuality of orientation defined in terms of 
shared patterns of normative cultural system of Pancasila. Ideally therefore, these 
patterns of Pancasila bring about the integration of the existing groups like a series of 
interlocking wheels. 
Perhaps it is necessary to trace further the notion of gotong royong, since it is -
to a large extent- the heart and the essence of Pancasila (Alfian 1996, 221). Pancasila 
is connected with gotong royong and capitalises on it as an ideal and important 
principle in human relations and national life. It is more in gotong royong that 
common endeavour, mutual help, and understanding in national life is to be 
understood. 
Gotong royong literally means mutual assistance but its most basic meaning is 
that of social harmony and identity of interest which relates cosmic harmony and 
which is achieved by specific acts of co-operation. It is originally a value of the 
Indonesian village. In traditional Java the term gotong royong is based on an old 
Indonesian .norm which demands consumptive interdependence and support on a 
family basis (Kahane 1973, 24). From a structural point of view it emphasises the 
broad family in which every member shares this output with other members of the 
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family. It was introduced as the most important element of Pancasila by Sukarno. 
Sukarno himself was born in the small village near the town of Blitar, East Java, and 
therefore he must have been shaped by the village order and intermarried its patterns 
and rhythms. The village way of life is indeed an important ingredient of Sukarno's 
thought and thus constitutes the most precious component of Pancasila (Alfian 1996, 
201). 
The Indonesian villages are a closed society. Individuals are members of the 
village. Their freedom of action is restricted in every way by the rule of the 
community. A person is part of a community as a whole. The collective not the 
individual element predominates in the communal ethos. The village society is 
characterised with communal consciousness with its emphasis on collective action 
(Van der Kroef 1954, 96). The collective pattern of behaviour provides a haven in 
which the individual almost gladly submerges him/herself. The village is a co-
operative enterprise where communal rights to the village resources traditionally take 
precedence over individual rights. Almost everywhere in the villages the concept of 
mutual assistance is strongly developed. This co-operative characteristic is not only a 
feature of an economic and social relationship, it is also basic to a pattern of religious 
relationship, communication and exchange. (Van der Kroef 1954, 98). These village's 
general set of values, the total pattern of values and the life-style of the village are the 
main components of the so-called go tong royong. 
Collectivist structure of village society is the original form of the village and 
peasant civilisation of Indonesia long before all other civilisations came. Historically 
the Indonesian village society constituted the basis of indigenous civilisation in the 
archipelago. When Hinduism/Buddhism arrived, the traditions of mutual assistance, 
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preferences of communal interests over individual one's, were strengthened. By the 
time Islam spread in the archipelago with its egalitarian doctrine the communalistic 
bases had become even more unshakeable, thanks to the communalistic aspects of the 
teaching of Islam. 
It is worth noting that the tenets of Indonesian collectivism stress the unbroken 
relationship between the group and the individual. The latter has rights in terms of the 
former and the former exists to give the latter meaning. For the Indonesians there was 
traditionally no cleavage between the individual and the collectivity because of the 
supremacy of a monistic worldview, which fuses the microcosmos of the individual·or 
humankind with the macrocosmos of the divine universe (Van der Kroef 1954, 101). 
Perhaps it is fair to argue that the notion of gotong-royong was considered to 
be the most important element of Pancasila. Pancasila without gotong royong would 
be less realistic. As a value therefore, gotong royong is very useful to Pancasila as it 
represents the traditional element of the value system of Indonesia. It stresses more 
emphatically the Pancasila's concern about the importance of a mutually-oriented 
normative order. It also directs individual to change their moral personalities and 
requires a new type of individual. Further, it enjoins that an individual's motivation 
must be altered from egocentrism into selflessness and togetherness. By gotong 
royong therefore, solidarity among the members of the society is expected to be easily 
found. 
The above was an exposition of Pancasila at the level of an "evaluative 
system", a system of religious and moral conceptions embodied in its five principles. 
Now we tum to Pancasila as symbolic system. 
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II. Pancasila as Symbolic System 
As a cultural system Pancasila, besides being supplied by normative values, is also 
equipped with a sacred symbol, the bird of Garuda Pancasila. In this chapter we deal 
with that national symbol of Garuda Pancasila. 
Called Garuda, this symbol consists of a golden eagle and carries a shield with 
the five symbols of Pancasila on it. The five symbols exemplify the five values of 
Pancasila. The shield symbolises self-defence in struggle and protection of the 
country and oneself. The background colours of the shield is red and white and 
denote the colours of the Indonesian flag. The five symbols on the shield that 
exemplify the five values of Pancasila are: the Golden Star which amplifies the first 
principle of Belief in One God. The second symbol, the Chain, symbolises the 
second principle of a Just and Civilised Humanity. The Beringin, or banyan tree 
represents the third value, that of Indonesian Unity. The fourth symbol, the Bull's 
Head, represents the fourth sila of Democracy, and the fifth symbol, the Gold and 
white Paddy symbolises social justice (Dahlan 1996, 25-6). 
The second sila, Just and Civilised Humanity is exemplified by the Chain 
because the chain symbolises mutual assistance toward others physically and 
organically. The third sila, Indonesian Unity is represented by the Beringin, because 
the tree symbolises a feeling of identification witI:i collectivities. The fomih sila, 
Democracy is represented by the head of the bull because it symbolises the reciprocity 
toward other personalities. The most important sila, Belief in One God is represented 
by the golden star because it symbolises the attitudes toward religious freedom and 
tolerance. 
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The bird Garuda also holds a banner by its talons in which another important 
national symbol, or rather national slogan. is located, viz. the slogan of national unity 
within national diversity. It is the national motto of Bhinneka Tunggal lka, which 
means Unity in Diversity .. Originated from twelfth-century Buddhist-Javanese text of 
Nagarakratagama, 31 Bhinneka Tunggal Ika is designed essentially alike to that of the 
American motto of Et Pluribus Unum. 
Garuda is a mythical bird. It is a symbol of strength and creative energy. The 
principle gold colour of Garuda Pancasila suggests the greatness of the nation. It 
consists of 17 feathers on each wing, 8 on the tail and 45 on the neck which stands for 
the date of Indonesia's proclamation of independence on 17th of August, 1945. 
The significance of this symbol however rests in its religious origin. It 
originated from the religious Indian Garuda, in the same way that the "five" principles 
of Pancasila originated from the Himayana Pancha-sila, namely a set of Javanised 
Buddhists principles, mentioned in one of the oldest preserved Buddhist-Javanese 
literary texts, the Nagarakratagama (Anderson 1990, 146). 
Historically, Garuda is a religiously sacred bird not only in Indonesia but also 
in many other places. In India for example, the bird Garuda is seen as a sacred bird. 
It is a mythical bird whose name means "devotee". It is a Vishnu vehicle (Vahana) 
and the emblem of his flagstaff. H.H Penner narrates the story of the birth and its 
deeds as told in the Mahabrata as follows: " .... Breaking the shell of his egg, he 
immediately grew to his giant size and flew into the atmosphere. The gods awed at 
his brilliance, sang his praise. Garuda eventually kills the great snakes who are 
31 Nagarakratagama is also the main source of the history ofMajapahit kingdom. It was written in the 
time of Hayam Wuruk's reign. According to Nagakratagama, Majapahit claimed a form of authority 
over far-flung vassal states throughout Sumatra, the Malaysian Peninsula, Kalimantan and eastern 
Indonesia. 
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protecting the elixir of immortality and steals· the elixir from the snakes and ·gods. 
Flying upward with the elixir he encounters Vishnu and requests two boons: that he, 
Garuda, will always be above Vishnu and that without drinking the elixir he will 
never age or die. Vishnu grants the wish. In return Garuda grants Vishnu a boon. 
Vishnu requests that Garuda become his mount. The request is granted .... " (1981, 
274). 
In Tibetan Buddhism, the Garuda is believed not only to be the mount of 
Vishnu but also his wife's, Lakshmi. Moreover, it is seen as a sun symbol and lived 
on a diet of nagas (snakes) the ultimate creatures of the earth. It is also believed to be 
the vehicle of Vajrapani, the symbol of the transcendent Buddha Amoghasiddhi. In 
Tibetan Buddhism, Garuda played an important role because of his similarity to the 
mythical Himalayan khyung bird. Four bull-horned khyung protected the four 
directions and a khyung appeared in the company of mountain spirits in the sacred 
dances of the Bon, the indigenous, pre-Buddhist religion of Tibet. With his heavenly 
associations and his sworn enmity to the evil forces of the earth, Garuda appealed to 
Mongolian Buddhists as a logical character for their own version of the tsam. In the 
Mongolian tsam, Garuda plays the role .of one of the Lords of the Four Mountains. It 
represents the Shamanistic Lord of Bogdo Ula, the sacred mountain south of modern 
32 Ulaanbaatar. 
Returning to our discussion on .Pancasila, the question remains: To what extent 
does the symbol of Garuda of the Pancasila play a role in the process of integrating 
the conflicting systems and norms in Indonesia? As a primary answer to the question 
32 Garuda: Spirit of Bogda Ula. The Asian Art Museum, Choijin-Lama Temple Museum, Mongolian 
Exhibition. http://www.asianart.com/mongolia/garuda. (No author mentioned) 
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let me simply argue that Garuda Pancasila, can (1) aid in communication between the 
three cognitive-discriminative social systems of the santri, priyayi, abangan, and of 
course other groups and parties such as ethnically-oriented political parties. 2) 
Regulate the interaction between them, and 3) serve directly to gratify religious needs 
and symbolically give a religious meaning to the life of the people, thanks to its 
religious origin. Being the national symbol, the role the Garuda Pancasila plays in 
domesticating the religiously conflicting society is like a "mother's response to her 
child while crying". The mother's response to her child helps in relieving the child's 
distress and at the same time accommodates the child's need for a mother. 
If that is the case -and that is truly the case as we will show below- then the 
symbolic system of Garuda Pancasila is very important. It is no less important than its 
counterpart of the evaluative system of Pancasila. However, Parsons as cited by 
Peacock (1976, 265) argued that symbol is less determinant than value for the purpose 
of social integration. That is to say, that when a society is at stake, evaluative 
arrangement rather than symbolic culture and value necessarily come to the fore and 
. play the more determinant role, according to Parsons. Parsons is not correct I believe 
in arguing so. Yes, it is true that symbols by comparison to values are less binding in 
a legal sense on its participants ramified spheres of life. It seems convincingly certain 
for example, that Islamic law shapes the form of Muslim families, while the Ka'bah, 
the most important religious symbol of Islam, does not. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that symbol is less important for the wider society or that it has less 
control over behaviour. Symbol must have a power in social patterning through the 
medium of the personality and by subtle psychological routes. Parsons in this sense 
is traditional and mechanistic. In reality, the symbolic system of Pancasila comes and 
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plays a role hand in hand with its evaluative system. They are at the same degree as 
far as integrating the various norms is concerned. Thus, when the five values of 
Pancasila were institutionalised, symbolic attitudes of the Garuda surrounded these 
values. Evaluative values of Pancasila become important and substantial only when 
equipped with the symbolic system of the Garuda. 
To really appreciate the importance of symbol in general and the symbolic 
system of Garuda Pancasila in particular, and to avoid the mechanistic explanation of 
Parsonian functionalism, one needs to look at the conception of symbol provided by 
Geertz. Geertz's rationale of symbolic systems was aimed at challenging the analytic 
machinery of Parson's functionalism by forcing it to operate within the constrains of 
the symbolic order. Geertz's symbolism shares with Parsons' functionalism though, 
certain assumptions. They share for example, in their conception of culture. It is from 
Parsons' conception of culture that Geertz developed the concept of symbol. Parsons' 
conception of culture consists of two levels, namely value and symbol. However, the 
starting point of Geertz's explanation of symbolism and its articulation with reality is 
Parsons' framework of culture (Karathe 1988, 55). However, while Geertz was 
influenced by Parsons, he differs with Parsons in that, while Parsons seemed to ignore 
the importance of symbolic system, Geertz seemed to put more stress on it. In 
addition, while Parsons seemed to incorporate the notion of symbol within the notion 
of culture, Geertz seemed to formulate the notion of symbol as a relatively 
autonomous system that can be studied in its own right. 
Yet, Geertz' s ramification of symbols is conditioned by his desire to reproduce 
Talcott Parsons' conception of culture by emphasising more on the notion of symbol. 
Geertz's definition of culture for example, is a refinement of Parsons' definition. He 
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defined culture as "an ordered system of meaning and symbols, in terms of which 
social interaction takes place" (Geertz 1966, 57). And he elucidated cultural activity 
as " ... an activity in which symbolism forms the positive content (Geertz 1966, 58). 
Parsons though understood culture as merely a system which is specifically concerned 
with systems of meaning (Parsons 1973, 36). Most importantly, Geertz's "Religion as 
a Cultural System" seemed to be a proposal to expand the conceptual envelope of the 
cultural dimension, as mapped out by Talcott Parsons and Edward Shils (1951 ). His 
proposal is that we need to treat symbols as forming patterns that "model" relations 
among entities, processes or what-have-you in physical, organic, social, or 
psychological systems, by 'paralleling,' 'imitating', or 'stimulating' them (Geertz 
1966, 59). The symbolic order runs parallel to and expresses or represents social and 
psychological processes that occur in the "real world". According to this analogy, 
symbols are mirrors of real social events. He conceives symbols as possessing a 
material or corporal aspect that can embody meaning and a meaningful aspect that is 
embodied in the corporeality of the symbol. He defines symbol as "any object, act, 
event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a conception- namely the 
symbol's meaning (Geertz 1966, 58). Thus, if the system of ev?luative value provides 
meaning, the system of symbol provides a conception, namely the meaning of symbol 
in Geertz's account. This implies as far as Pancasila is concerned, that Pancasila with 
its two systems of value and symbol is actually meaningful to the survival of the 
society on the grounds that matters imp01iant to the integration and survival of society . 
as a whole must be controlled by the mechanisms of an evaluative system and 
symbolic order. 
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The point to be emphasised here is that symbolic system is not less important 
than value system. On the contrary, a value system in some instances is more 
problematic and thus less determinant than a symbolic system. The first value of 
Pancasila for example, Belief in One God, is often considered by Muslims as being 
repugnant because it uses the word Tuhan instead of Allah. It thus arouses Muslim 
resistance. At this point the value of Pancasila has one type of control more 
indecisive than that of the symbol of Garuda. Simultaneously, the symbol of Garuda I 
assume, can help -thanks to its religious quality and origin- anchor the new national 
identity by symbolically converting it into "faith". Here faith is a source of stability 
and integration because all critical elements of humankind are touched in some 
important manner by faith. Faith is also a means whereby people together identify 
themselves, organise their community, find meaning for their sentiments, and express 
their beliefs and identity. Through the Garuda then, people can express symbolically 
their religious faith, sentiment, belief and identity. 
Apart from whether symbol is more determinant than value or vice versa, 
Pancasila at its two levels is common, inclusive, and overarching faith that transcends 
the more primordial faith. Both the symbol of Garuda and the values of Pancasila 
constitute this faith. They both together bestow "religious" meaning and conception 
in the sense that: firstly, they symbolise a religious emotion and secondly they 
subsume religious experiences by uniting symbolically the image of the existence of 
God (in the formation of the sacred bird, Garuda) with the conception of Monotheistic 
God expressed in the first value of Pancasila, Belief in One God. By doing so 
Pancasila has indeed initiated an adjustment between religious primordial ties by · 
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which religious interaction can proceed freely without seriously threatening the 
religious framework of private religious identity. 
The political implication of Pancasila being endowed with "religious" 
meaning is that the state is now elevated to the level of a 'religiously' legitimate state. 
III. Anti-Pancasila Movements 
Although Pancasila has elevated the state into a "religiously" legitimate state, the 
question remains; Legitimate for who? It is important to note that despite the fact that 
"Belief in One God" expresses a religious emotion and maintains a profoundly rooted 
"consciousness of a religious kind", it remains a source of social, political and 
religious discord. One of the possible reasons is that it is perhaps too general and thus 
allows any particular religion to continue to claim that its religious belief has not been 
expressed in it. 
Radical santri Muslim and the abangan were among those to dispute the 
Pancasila and its first value. For the santri, as we have said, the unacceptability of the 
first value lies in its usage of the word Tuhan instead of Allah. And for the abangan, 
the Pancasila is unacceptable because the abangans were antithetical to every existing 
social and political status quo, including Pancasila. 
Pancasila thus set another stage for a direct clash between private religious 
individuality and the common national identity. It simplified a new level of religious 
antagonism and raised a new spectre of primordial separatism. Hence, it still failed to 
become a common kind of identity during at least three decades after it had been 
founded, a time during which various rebellions against Pancasila emerged. The most 
serious rebellions were the Darul Islam revolts between 1948 and 1962, and the 
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Communist-abangan G30 S/PKI, Gerakan 30 September PKI, A Revolt of September 
30th, 1965. 
A series of Islamic-inspired armed uprisings emerged in West-Java, South 
Sulawesi, and Aceh. In West Java it began in 1948, three years after the 
announcement of Pancasila. Backed by the military unit of the Hizbullah, it 
proclaimed an independent Islamic state in the Priangan West Java under the 
leadership of Kartosuwirjo (1905-62) and vowed to continue the armed struggle 
against Pancasila. By the year 1950's the Islamic revolt had spread to South Sulawesi 
and Aceh. In South Sulawesi the Darul Islam was led by Kahar Muzakkar (1921-65) 
from 1951 to 1961. In Aceh, a town in the island of Sumatra the Darul Islam was led 
by Tengku Daud Beureuh (1900-87), a leading Acehnese religious figure from 1953 to 
1961. Daud Beureuh from 1947 was military governor of the province of north 
Sumatra including Aceh. Two years later, he demanded formal recognition of Aceh as 
a separate province. In early 1953 when Sukarno visited Aceh, Daud made it more 
clear that he refused Pancasila and wanted Islam. In September 1953 he proclaimed 
Aceh's recession from the Republic of Indonesia and its adherence to the Indonesian 
Islamic State of the Darul Islam (Cribb 1995, 38, 40-1). The revolt in Aceh was the 
greatest among the santri's revolts as the Acehnese were renowned for the strength of 
their devotion to Islam. 
Sukarno realising that the santris were anti-Pancasila, commenced not only 
military operations against them but also banned their strongest and largest Islamic 
political party, Masjumi in 1960s. 
Meanwhile, during the 1950's the threat of the communist abangan had also 
grown. On 30 September/I October 1965 the danger of the communists was 
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culminating in their attempt to overthrow the government through a coup d'etat. This 
was thought to be the most hideous rebellion against Pancasila in the history of 
Indonesia. Six senior military commanders were abducted and assassinated, half a 
million civilians died, and hundreds of thousands were imprisoned. 33 
The communist tendency of revolt against Pancasila had begun in fact, as early 
as 1948 when it was involved in the anti-Pancasila rising in the city ofMadiun in East 
Java. Despite the government's attempt to ban it, Communism continued to survive, 
thanks to the tactic of promoting the formation of a united national front including the 
national bourgeoisie (Cribb 1995, 55). The breadth of this national front reflected the 
communist view that Pancasila had indeed freed the country politically from colonial 
domination, but had not freed it from the economic colonialism which was 
represented in the continuing dominance of the economy by non-indigenous capital 
both Chinese and European. 
In dealing with the anti-Pancasila revolts both from the radical santri and 
abangan, Sukarno took the initiative of bringing Pancasila in line with the ideal of 
national life. The ingredients of this climacteric surge in order to pass Pancasila as the 
national identity were, building one of the world's largest mosques, the national 
mosque Istiqlaal, building a colossal sports stadium, a national monument of Monas 
which is higher than the Eiffel Tower, together with a flood of slogans, catchwords, 
proclamations and so on. In an attempt to ideologically domesticate these rebellions 
33 According to the official version of Soeharto's regime, Soeharto was the one that cracked down the 
coup attempt. He was major general and then Chief of the Army's Strategic Command. However, after 
Soeharto's downfall there has been an allegation by one of the former senior official that Soeharto had 
knowledge about the plot to overthrow the government. This implies that Soeharto might have been 
involved in the notorious coup attempt. 
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and balance the contending forces of santri, abangan, and priyayi, Sukarno advocated 
another symbol besides Pancasila, a concept known as ''NASAKOM" (an acronym 
formed from Nasionalisme, the ideology of priyayi; Agama literally means religion 
and refers to santri's ideology; and Komunisme, the philosophy of abangan) in the 
1960s.34 The concept of Nasakom hence, referred to a unity of nationalism, religion, 
and communism, and merged the representatives of the main powers in Indonesia. 
Not long after it was founded though, Nasakom dissolved in 1969's for one reason; 
because the idealism of Nasakom was too alien to the common people of Indonesia 
(Moerdiono 1996, 386). 
Thus Pancasila together with its duplicate Nasakom still couldn't be fully 
welcomed in a concrete society. This fact was coupled with the national solidarity 
being faded. The political status quo had deteriorated, whereas the political rebellions 
strengthened. The political equilibrium was missing and the nation became like a 
classic case of integrative failure. Every step towards passing Pancasila as a national 
identity only increased "ideological" discontent. With each increase in ideological 
discontent a new revelation of political incapacity was promoted, and with each new 
revelation of political incapacity, political nerve and a more disparate resort to an 
unstable amalgam of military coercion was only encouraged. The society was now 
completely at stake. The first general elections of 1955 further stirred the already 
deteriorating situation. It even shifted the central gravity of Pancasila when the most 
hostile party to Pancasila, the abangan 's PK.I, strengthened. The party gained some 
34 It was during this period too that Sukarno echoed his notorious doctrine of marhaenism. The 
marhaen is the little man, the peasant or the proletariat. Sukarno loved to discuss politics in his 
speeches in terms of a legendary "papa" marhaen, an old man who is the distillation of peasant wisdom, 
and whose thought, emotions, and wishes Sukarno purported to understand very well. 
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16 percent of the total vote and drew nearly 90 percent of its support from Java.35 The 
abangan position was further fortified by the fact that in 1956 Muhammad Hatta the 
vice president to Sukarno resigned, a move that in essence was a political setback so 
far as the priyayi and perhaps the santri were concerned. Hatta, was part of the priyayi 
faith but was sympathetic to the santri faith in the same way that Sukarno belonged to 
Pancasila but was symphatetic to the abangan. Being radical and now become -to 
some extent- the axis of Indonesian life, the abangan caused the religious and political 
balance to be upset. The advance toward religious disaffection entered its radical 
phase. Violence alternated with a frantic search for political panaceas. Abortive 
coups and misfired assassination attempts followed one after the other. 
Despite all of this, the Sukarno years witnessed a proud invention of Pancasila, 
and a proud contrivance of Nasakom. However, events which culminated in the 
military coup have shown that the function of Pancasila and Nasakom was limited. 
They did not operate quite effectively from 1945 until 1965. No strong integrative 
outcome had resulted and they almost ripped the nation apart. By the end of 1965 
both mechanisms of Pancasila and Nasakom could not regulate and balance the 
antagonistic society.36 The situation had constantly deteriorated. The country was 
speeches in terms of a legendary "papa" marhaen, an old man who is the distillation of peasant wisdom, 
and whose thought, emotions, and wishes Sukarno purported to understand very well. 
35 In 1948, PKI was already on the verge of making the most spectacular comeback of its chequered 
history after two decades (it was found in 1924) of the leadership crisis. In an internal contest which 
ended in January 1951 the youthful leadership of Aidit, Lukman, Njoto and Sudisman took control of 
the party. From the beginning Aidit insisted that Marxism was a guide to action not an inflexible 
dogma. His leadership brought a new pragmatism to PKI which enabled it shortly to become one of the 
largest political parties. PKI's base was primarily among urban and agricultural estate workers, who 
were organised through the union federation SOBSI (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, All 
Indonesia's Workers' Organisation Centre). Later the party was to expand to other sectors of society, 
including the peasantry. See, (Ricklefs 1993, 241). 
36 Memerangi Ideologi, Memonopoli Kekuasaan. Forum On-line, http://www.forum.co.id. August 
1998. Also Soedjatmoko, in his Introduction to An Introduction to Indonesian Historiography, 
mentioned that in this particular time the sense of Indonesian individuality had weakened, without 
mentioning the failure of Pancasila and Nasakom as the national symbols. He also mentioned that those 
circumstances had led the nation to search for the clearer definition of national identity. See 
(Soedjatmoko 1965, xi). 
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convulsed with violence and unbridled rage in which hundreds of thousands were 
slaughtered, cut down in their homes, in their villages and in congested city alleys. 
Following this uncontrollable worsening situation, Sukarno departed in 1968. This 
violence carried an empathic, horrific and incontrovertible message: Sukarno's dream 
of unifying a fractious populace of Islamist santri, Nationalist priyayi, and 
Communist abangan by the force of Pancasila and Nasakom had been a mirage, 
fantasy and colossal miscalculation. Sukarno, together with Nasakom thus finally 
collapsed. Interestingly though, Pancasila survived. It had not declined although it 
suffered from major legitimacy problems and almost lost its confidence. 
The next attempt to reconstruct and pass Pancasila as the common national 
identity was done by Soeharto -the direct successor to Sukarno- through the 
mechanism of ritualisation of Pancasila. 
IV. Ritualisation of Pancasila 
By the time Soeharto came to power in March 1968 he was forced to establish stable 
authority in an extraordinarily unstable time, a time where intense decades-long 
rivalries between santri, abangan, and priyayi had come to a head in a ferocious orgy 
of violence. 
The chaos resulting in those days could be the reflection of the contrast 
between the ideals and the cosmos pictured in Pancasila and the real situation in the 
real life. However, Pancasila's ideals and cosmos remained -and still remain-
relevant. They are concerned with the notion of unification and the notion of a 
common national identity. Pancasila was furthermore designed to be a meeting place 
between various trends and norms that each member in the society could supposedly 
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partially identify with without abolishing their own particularistic symbol and identity. 
It was meant to be an all-encompassing philosophy of life. 
Soeharto's task was thus not to change these ideals and cosmos of Pancasila. 
His task was rather to ideologically reconstruct contrivances to bring Pancasila closer 
to reality and reinforce mechanisms by which the sacredness of Pancasila could be 
strengthened. What I mean by reality is social, economic, political and particularly 
religious conditions of Indonesian society. 
In order to bring Pancasila closer to reality, Pancasila was then brought to 
centre on the development of three aspects. On the political level it centred on the 
development of a single system of central authority through a single party7, Golkar. 
On the economic level it centred on the material development of the country, and on 
the "religious" level it centred on the ritualisation of Pancasila. All three are 
intimately connected as a process of bringing Pancasila closer to reality and 
reinforcing its sacredness (Mubyarto 1996/239-248, Swasono 1996/249-283, 
Tjokroamidjojo 1996/309-325). 
On the economic level not much can be said except to admit that the President 
Soeharto' s government indeed succeeded in transforming the country from the poor 
and stagnant country it took over in 1966 into a dynamic and steadily developing, one, 
before bringing it back into poverty. 
On the political level, great emphasis has been put on the centrality of 
Pancasila as the ideological basis of Indonesian nationhood. It was then turned into 
ideology expressed through the mechanism of the "single" party, the Golkar. This 
37 There were three parties in Soeharto's time, namely PPP, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, The Unity 
and Development Party. PDI, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, Indonesian Democracy Party. And 
Soeharto's party Golkar. In practice it was only Golkar that functioned as a party, while the other two 
were intentionally circumcised, and politically dead. 
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party is designed together with the ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, 
The Defence Force of the Republic oflndonesia, as the defenders of Pancasila. 
On the "religious" level Pancasila centred on ritualisation both in ceremonies 
and thought. In order to be ritualised, or rather consecrated in thought, Pancasila was 
invested with the aspect of sacredness, namely the kesaktian (the Javanese notion of 
super-powerfulness, divinity, and sacredness). Thus Pancasila from the 1970's was 
called Pancasila-Sakti;38 the super-powerful, divine, and sacred Pancasila. Once a 
year on the Day of Kesaktian Pancasila, September 30, Pancasila is sanctified. 
Historically it is called sakti because it is believed to be the saviour of the state and 
the nation from the danger of the Communism and as such, from the notorious 30 
September 1965 coup attempt by the communists. 
The sacredness and immortality of Pancasila are thus institutionalised. It had 
indeed become a sacred reality, considered by the nation as sacred (Wibisono 1998, 1) 
and hence deemed to be "separated" from all that is "profane". Officially it is not as 
vulgar or drab as any other identity or ideology. 
-
The notion of sakti or kesaktian is an ancient Javanese concept. In the old 
Javanese tradition there must always be a ruler under whose leadership stability, 
security, and prosperity are maintained and all political entities are combined in a 
coherent unity. This ruler must be sakti or has kesakten and must be treated as sacred 
if the process of combining all political entities and maintaining stability, security, 
38 Besides being called sakti, Pancasila is also being associated with the Army doctrine of Tri Ubaya 
Cakti, which literally means the three super-powerful formulas. This doctrine emerged in 1965 in 
Bandung, not long after Pancasila "saved" the country from the deadly coup attempt by the 
communists. This Sanskrit formula is not without significance since its symbolism invokes in the mind 
of its Javanese beholder traditional notion of power. Tri means three, and cakti or sakti means super-
powerful. The three formulas are, 1) The doctrine of Basic National Security, 2) The Doctrine of civil 
action, and 3) The doctrine of development. See (Gunn 1979, 754) 
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and prosperity of the state are to succeed (Anderson 1990, 25). A striking illustration 
of this is the word Buwana, which means world, and alam which means universe. 
These two words have been used since 1705 by the rulers of the Javanese Kingdom of 
Mataram (Anderson 1990, 45) and are still used until today by the descendants of the 
kings that still exist in the town of Y ogyakarta, e.g. Paku Buwana (Pivot of the 
world), Hamengkubuwana (Sustainer of the world), and Paku Alam (Pivot of the 
Universe). By attributing these_ tittles of buwana and alam they are assumed to be 
super-powerful and sacred and accordingly the requisite mimesis which binds them 
and the people is achieved by this mystique which historically was reinforced by the 
myth that the king was literally sacred, super-powerful and divine. Besides the kings 
of Mataram other early Javanese leaders such as Ken Arok cifthe 13th century, Gadja 
Mada of the 14th century, and Panembahan Senopati of the 16th century also used the 
titles of kesakten. Even Sukarno and Soeharto were believed to have kesakten or at 
least have something/someone sakti to protect them.39 However, since Soeharto came 
to power this quality of kesakten was attributed to Pancasila officially by calling it 
Pancasila-Sakti. 
Ideological indoctrination has been a powerful instrument in making Pancasila 
sanctified in thought. This ideological indoctrination is known as P4 -Pedoman 
Pengamalan dan Penghayatan Pancasila- (Formula for the Cognisance and 
Implementation of Pancasila). Having been approved by the People's Consultative 
Assembly's decision on 22 March 1978, this indoctrination is organised throughout 
the archipelago. Under this program it is compulsory for all students below university 
39 It is common knowledge amon-g Indonesians that Soeharto did have what we call Dukun (a super-
natural man) who claims to have knowledge about the invisible world. 
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level to take subject on Pancasila, known as Pendidikan Moral Pancasila (PMP), the 
Education of Pancasila's Morality, whose texts are a blend of ideology and theology 
and somehow mixtures of mysticism and pragmatism. The texts are meant to provide 
guidance for moral conduct and help define an individual's relationship to the state. 
The norms of egalitarianism, mutual relationship, and mass participation in social life 
are also expressed in the texts. 
Students· of university level are also obliged to attend two-week upgrading 
courses before they can commence their studies. All state officials, civil servants 
(Korpri, Karp Pegawai Negeri Indonesia, Corporation of Civil Servant of Indonesia) 
and their wives (Dharma Wanita, Good Women) are required to attend the courses at 
certain times. Through these courses everyone are brainwashed in such a way that 
they will inculcate an ethos of unquestioning obedience and acceptance of the 
Pancasila hierarchy. Korpri and Dharma Wanita have no way out but to "worship" 
Pancasila as their lives are dependent on the state. They are completely dictated. 
They must wear uniform to go to their offices and above all they must constantly show 
their adherence and "monoloyalty'' to the Pancasila. Their offices, even in the isolated 
rural areas, must display the picture of Garuda Pancasila in between the picture of the 
president and the vice-president. 
Having been invested and identified with the sacred, and after all, being 
considered as sacred, Pancasila is now to be ritually devoted. Certainly, the 
experience of sacredness could not emerge from routine or everyday interaction, it 
must emerge from rituals or ceremonies. Once a week therefore, members of Korpri 
and Dharma Wanita must attend a seemingly ritual parade to declare their loyalty to 
Pancasila. Students below university level are also required to attend a weekly 
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Monday morning ceremony in uniform and parade in a seemingly ritualistic service. 
They sing the national anthem of Indonesia Raya (Great Indonesia) and pronounce 
together the five principles of Pancasila to announce their devotion to the faith of 
Pancasila. The ritual to sanctify Pancasila continues throughout the year. The annual 
ritual of Independence Day, 17 August is also held. 
One probably could speculate whether Pancasila's ceremonies are ritual or not, 
or whether they are religious or secular. The answer to that is that here I am not 
concerned with the ceremonies or rituals of Pancasila being religious or secular, for 
what is important in these rituals and ceremonies is not the supernatural idiom. I have 
been rather concerned with the more crucial issue, i.e. the effects these rituals have in 
the process of sacralising and fostering Pancasila, and thus promoting stability and 
integration. Since Pancasila functions like religion -although it is not religion as such 
(Wahid 1996, 166), its rituals function the way religious rituals do. However, being 
closely affiliated with a sacred thing and taken for granted to be "immutable", 
Pancasila does resemble religion and only differs with it in degree not in kind. While 
religion for example, has mystical and supernatural transcendence, Pancasila has .its 
roots in religious myth and has elements of transcendental ideals. Pancasila has 
mysticism, symbol as well as authority like religion. Both Pancasila and religion 
involve a system of value, a system to which the allocation of good and bad, right and 
wrong is relevant. Above all, both religion and Pancasila have mechanisms of ritual. 
To sanctify Pancasila for example, students, memb(;:rs of Korpri and Dharma Wanita 
are obliged to display manners that are typical of sectarian behaviour: the surrender of 
their individuality to the Pancasila cause. However, while the ritual of Pancasila is 
essentially rational, the ritual of religion is non-rational. While the ritual of religion is 
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more religiously constructed and therefore more immutable, the ritual of Pancasila is 
more consciously socially constructed and therefore less immutable. 
Now, how do the rituals of Pancasila contribute to and function in the process 
of stability and integration in the society. Geertz has given a brilliant explanation as 
to how rituals can contribute to the process of stability and integration in a society. In 
his seminal article "Religion as Cultural System", he states that "a re~igion is a system 
of symbol which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and 
motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and 
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and 
motivations seem uniquely realistic (1966, 4 ). It is in ritual, he continues, or "cultural 
performances" in his term, that the moods and motivations which sacred symbol 
induce in men, and the general conceptions of the order of existence which they 
formulate for men, meet and reinforce one another (1966, 66). 
Now, since Pancasila is seen to be the highest form of a system of symbol (as 
well as a system of value), it has to be "religiously" ritualised if its moods and 
motivations are to be accomplished. 
Politically Pancasila is to be ritualised too and seen as the sole political 
"religion" of the whole nation. Thus it became the sole ideological basis for any 
political party in the country. To make sure that Pancasila in its regular working and 
development as the sole political religion worked smoothly, Soeharto in 1982 
officially disposed a policy that forced all social, religious, and political organisations 
to adopt Pancasila as their only ideological basis. This doctrine is called Asas 
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Tungga!, 40 and was coupled with the slogm~ of Manusia Indonesia Seutuhnya 
Berdasarkan Pancasila, which literally means "a perfect Indonesian man on the basis 
of Pancasila". This slogan could technically mean that it is only through Pancasila 
that a "perfect man" can be created, and as long as a man is not a Pancasila-ist, he is 
not perfect. 
Soeharto stressed that Pancasila is the only identity of the nation. He also 
warned that the existence of any alternative identity apart from Pancasila would be 
illegitimate. Organisations that refused to adopt Pancasila in their bylaws, 
constitutions, or charter were illegitimate (Alfian 1996, 206) and banned by the 
government. By so doing, Pancasila had indeed became successful in promoting 
political stability. But on the side of the. coin, by being forced as Asas Tunggal 
coupled with the mechanism of a "single" party, Pancasila was turned into a 
monopolistic system. Within it, the government developed new monopolistic political 
policies and doctrines in keeping with which political pluralism was seen as not only 
dangerous, but also as challenging Pancasila and the legitimacy of Soeharto's regime. 
The left and the right, namely the Communists (mostly abangan) and the Islamists 
(namely the radical santris) were deemed as a potential threat to Pancasila as well as 
to the national unity. They had been excluded from the mainstream of ideological 
consensus from the beginning of Soeharto' s regime. They were -albeit in a different 
way- excluded and deprived from any kind of economic, political, or social activities. 
This highly arbitrary rule was further extended in the late 1980s by a regulation 
discriminating against particularly the children of parents who had been or might have 
40 After the downfall of Soeharto the Asas Tunggal has come under scrutiny. As such, the question of 
whether the Asas Tunggal should still be regarded as the sole ideological basis for any political party 
has been once again debated. Up till now there has been no result from the political debate. 
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been influenced by Communist-Marxist thinking. The santris, because of their refusal 
to accept the Pancasila's Asas Tunggal also suffered. Their refusal resulted in the 
incident of September 1984 Tanjung Priok, a port in North Jakarta, where five 
hundred people were reportedly killed. Two santri members of the Petition Fift/1, 
including retired Major General H.R. Dharsono and prominent Muslim preacher A.M. 
Fatwa were arrested on charges of trying to subvert Pancasila (Fatwa, 1995). 
Thus, once having become Asas Tunggal, Pancasila became monopolistic, and 
when it became monopolistic, factors other than Pancasila, including pluralism in 
political belief, are all conspicuously absent and forbidden. 
Besides Pancasila' s undercut of the legitimacy of alternative ideologies, it also 
prevented public expression, ideas and opinions. Freedom of expression was strongly 
restricted. Criticising the government and the authority, particularly the president, and 
even a member of cabinet minister was a subversion. Dissent from official doctrine 
apart from Pancasila was seen as a source of discomfort. Students and intellectuals 
were strictly watched. Overt dissent was virtually silenced since 1980s not only by 
the government's broad powers of detention and its use of legal weapons to silence 
critics in the name of Pancasila, but also through the fear of being blacklisted or the 
denial of rights to travel abroad. Pancasila was thus used to "execute" a tradition of 
intellectual and civil rights. It was also used as a justification to subordinate the rights 
and wishes of individuals to those of the government's and most ridiculously, to that 
of Soeharto's own will. Pancasila was also driven by Soeharto as an ideological 
means to protect his and his family's hydra-like business interests. From a business 
41 Petition Fifty is an opposition group against Soeharto's regime. Its members are 50 in number, most 
of whom are significant and powerful figures whose support for Soeharto against Sukarno in the mid-
J 960s helped bring about the end of Sukarno. 
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point of view, Soeharto was more interested in the accumulation of wealth for his own 
pocket than in developing the country. Among his sons and daughters who were only 
in their twenties, had assembled fast-growing business empires and sizeable fortunes. 
Soeharto insisted that they were engaged in business for social and welfare-oriented 
ends. His eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Hastuti Rukmana even suggested that her 
father's position was a hindrance to her business activities. The Soeharto family was 
acquiring control over the fastest growing and most lucrative areas of the country. All 
these were achieved by practices of monopoly, nepotism and corruption. In addition, 
there is no legislation governing these business empires for their exemption from tax 
and auditing. The scale of their enterprises was so great that scarcely any large project 
could proceed without the involvement of one of the family's business groups. 
Government ministers came under pressure to channel tenders and projects in their 
favour. Having all kinds of major business their greed remained extremely unlimited. 
From a political point of view, there was no willingness on the part of 
Soeharto to make the country democratic and transparent. Young people particularly 
students and intellectuals were denied a chance to take initiatives. 
Soeharto also rejected the notion of alternative candidates for the presidency. 
Officially, one tenth of the one thousand members of the MPR (Maj/is 
Permusyawaratan Rakyat, People's Consultative Assembly) which elects the 
president was directly selected by him, while the rest were selected indirectly. All of 
them had to undergo a rigorous screening procedure. In most cases the members were 
not intellectually equipped since absolute and blind loyalty to the president rather than 
intellect was the political precondition for a person to be a member of the MPR. In 
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effect MPR members were not composed of elected representatives. The vocal people 
on the other hand were kept away from the politics often by force. 
Soeharto's policies were hence converting Pancasila into a directly coercive 
mechanism that in turn did not have the effect of keeping the original value, meaning 
and purpose of Pancasila. In short, Soeharto contradicted the values, meaning and 
purpose of Pancasila. 
Conclusion 
In his study of religious society, Durkheim proposed that every relatively stable 
society will posses a set of shared beliefs, values, and symbols that expresses the 
highest aspirations of the collectivity, and that are elevated to the level of 
transcendence, thereby becoming an integrative focus for members of the society 
(1976). Parallel to this, W. Lloyd Warner suggested that "complex societies must 
have a common core of basic understandings known and used by everyone or their 
complex and diverse symbolic superstructure will not stand. They need a general 
symbol system that everyone not only knows but feels" (1959, 4). Robbin Williams 
also suggested that "Every functioning society, to an important degree, have a 
common religion. The possession of a common set of ideas, rituals and symbols, he 
continues, can supply an overarching sense of unity" (1952). 
Parsons, likely influenced by Durkheim's ideas of common religion, 
introduced the so-called common core or "value consensus", as he sometimes called 
it. Having determined at the theoretical level that a society needs value consensus, 
Parsons subsequently developed his theoretical framework by postulating the tri-
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partite existence of an institutional system that entails a social system, cultural system, 
and personality system. The main focus of my thesis has been on the social and 
cultural systems. 
Robert Bellah, Parsons' student.and strongly influenced by him, developed the 
notion of American Civil Religion. He found in the Parsonian "value consensus" the 
key to social solidarity. Thus he argued that any coherent and viable society rests 
upon a common set of moral understanding about good and bad, right and wrong, in 
the realm of individual and social action (1970/1975). His contribution to the value 
consensus is such that these common moral understandings must rest in turn upon a 
common set of religious understandings. In other words, the values must be 
transcendental. Besides Bellah, Clifford Geertz subsequently modified Parsons' 
framework of cultural system. While Geertz, consistent with Parsons, has focused 
much of his research attention on the importance of culture, he made implicitly one 
important insight, viz. the importance of symbolic conception. 
I am therefore, in a good position to presume a basic dialectic between 
Parsons, Bellah, and Geertz, and marry their theoretical framework together. 
However, it is essentially those ideas of shared, transcendent values and symbol that 
bring our typology of Pancasila close to that of Parsons' value consensus, Bellah's 
American Civil Religion, and Geertz' s concept of symbol. 
So far we have discussed Pancasila not only in terms of it being a shared value 
and symbol at metaphorical level, but also in terms of what might be called 
conceptual realism, namely Pancasila as a real entity rather than abstract, as a reality 
sui generis. It is a real entity because from the perspective of its specific meaning it 
provides moral and religious integration. Further, it is a real entity because it is an 
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attempt to construct by means of selective fashion of various existing norms, a new 
symbolic framework within which to give form, value and meaning to the nation. 
To be effectively integrative, Pancasila incarnates religious norms and symbols 
that extend the capacity of Pancasila into a sacred "faith". It evokes generalised 
sacred values and symbols in widely dissimilar religious groups and individuals. We 
have seen that at the level of value, Pancasila uses for example, a religious statement 
of Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa. This is in essence a common matrix of religious 
commitment which is broadly shared between various "denominations" and forms the 
basis of the sense in which the society as a whole form a religiously based moral 
community. It is a value that makes the meeting of santri Salvationism/Universalism, 
priyayi Populism, and revolutionary Abanganism possible. We, on the other hand, 
have seen that at the level of symbol Pancasila is invested with the geneologically 
sacred bird of Garuda. Here, sacralisation is the inevitable and indiscriminate process 
that accompanies Pancasila and thus there is a close affinity between Pancasila and 
sacralisation. 
However, the association of Pancasila with the bird of Garuda is perhaps in 
agreement with the argument that a human society tends to adopt totemic animals as 
sacred symbols and that the totemic animal is treated with great veneration and 
circumspection (Durkheim 1976, 128-9). 
Thus far, I have attempted to defend my thesis that Pancasila was devised to be 
the common national identity, and that as identity, Pancasila was/is undergoing a 
process of sacralisation, and the mechanism of the sacralisation consists mainly of 
ritual. 
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Now, as an identity Pancasila had been accepted as the property of the nation 
(Oesman 1996, 1). Intrinsically, Pancasila did somehow provide an answer to the 
biggest problem the nation ever had, namely a sense of one identity, togetherness and 
oneness. I am not saying that Pancasila did succeed in bringing the nation towards 
oneness. What I am saying is that Pancasila did help create a sense of togetherness as 
well as integration and unity. However, having played upon microcosm-macrocosm 
conceit, Pancasila was manipulated by Soeharto for his own economic and political 
interests. This resulted in Pancasila being fragile, and thus in the society being in the 
throes of political and economic crises. Pancasila's reputation had been severely 
damaged by Soeharto. His authoritarian rule generated it into, and used it as 
justification for such practices as egoism, anomie, corruption, monopoly, nepotism, 
and so on. 
I think the short-term solution for the current political and economic crisis 
facing Indonesia is, what I would call the "intellectual rationalisation" of Pancasila. 
That is, that Pancasila must be freed from being identical to Soehartoism, namely 
from Soeharto's authoritarianism, egoism, nepotism, corruption, and collusion. 
Besides, to be continuously novel, it must constantly stress more the idiom of 
egalitarianism and social progress. In the long-run, Pancasila -as far as the notion of 
common identity is concerned- is the closest possible alternative for Indonesia. But it 
must be hauled by a capable and clean leader with developed intellectual and technical 
skills. The next leader must be economically literate so that the worsening economic 
situation can be resolved. He/she must be ideologically conscious so that the 
relatively stable pattern of Pancasila will not dissolve. Ideological homogeneity must 
be regularly promoted because Indonesia can not be an Iran-like Islamic state, nor can 
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